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IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
The Court has granted the motion of the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah to appear as amicus curiae for the
purposes of supporting plaintiff Kenneth Sullivan's Petition
for Rehearing. Section 35-1-46 U.C.A. requires all
employers in the State to secure payment of workers
compensation benefits by purchasing private insurance,
qualifylng as a "self-xnsured" or by obtaxning insurance
from the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. (Hereinafter
"WCF", WCF is a "...nonprofit, self-supporting, guasx-
public corporation..." [Section 35-3-3(1)(a) U.C.A.] whose
purpose is to "...insure Utah employers against liability
for compensation based on job-related accidental injurxes
and occupational diseases; and...assure payment of this
compensation to Utah employees who are entitled to it..."
[Section 35-3-2(1)(b)(i) and (ii)]. WCF ia charged by lts
enabling legislation to "...provide workers' compensation
insurance at an actuarially sound price..." [Section 35-3-
4(1) U.C.A.] WCF provides workers- compensation coverage
for in excess of 25,000 Utah employers or approximately 85
percent of the gross number of employers in the State of
Utah. Those 25,000 employers employ approximately 260,000
Utah workers. (See affidavit of Rodney c Smith, Vice
President, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, Appendix l
hereto.) Because of the breadth of its involvement with the
Workers' Compensation Act of Utah [Section 35-1-1 et seq.1
and the Occupational Disease Act of Utah [Section 35-2-1 et
seq.], WCF believes its input may be of assistance to the
Court in determining whether to grant Kenneth Ray Sullivan's
Petition for Rehearing.
WCF has further interest in the outcome of the Supreme
Court's decision herein. It is the workers' compensation
insurance carrier for the third-party defendant, CCC&T, in
the case of Brown vs. Bowman &Kemp Steel and Supply
Company, Inc., et al. vs. CCC&T, Inc., Supreme Court No.
910082 which was consolidated with Sullivan for oral
argument. WCF has provided the defense for CCC&T, Inc. as
is required by its policy of insurance.
WCF's concern with the Sullivan opinion is essentially
two-fold:
1. This Court has not had the opportunity to
adequately review the intent of the 1986 Legislature
from members of the legislature. Most particularly the
intent of S.B. 64's principal sponsor, Senator Haven J.
Barlow and Co-Sponsor former Senator Paul Rogers as
well as others. That information is provided by
affidavits attached hereto.
2. The majority did not address constitutional issues
which materially impact the balancing of rights between
employers and employees as contained in the Workers
Compensation Act of Utah SS35-1-1 et seq. U.C.A. which
will likely result in challenges to the "exclusive
remedy provision" of §35-1-60 U.C.A., the subrogation
rights of employers and their insurance carriers
contained in §35-1-62 U.C.A. and the Workers
Compensation Act in its entirety. There are seven
years worth of cases now pending at the trial court
level in which such issues have been and will be raised
with many more to come before the Utah Legislature can
take any action as suggested in Sullivan. This Court
should use its discretion to order those issues fully
briefed now to avoid the explosion of litigation which
will undoubtedly result by leaving those issues open.
STATEMENT OF TTTE ISSUES
The Court is referred to IDENTITY nr amicus nwr^
immediately preceding and the brief of plaintiff Sullivan xn
support of the Petition for Rehearing filed
contemporaneously herewith.
STANDARD or REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Court has within its discretion to grant a
Petition for Rehearing if the Court ...has overlooked or
misapprehended...points of law or fact..."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SECTIONS
Utah Workers' Compensation Act Sections 35-1-1 et seq.
lT -C.A. (Appendix 2)
1. Section 35-1-60 U.C.A. Exclusive remedy against
employer, or officer, agent or employee...
2. Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. Third-party and Subrogation
rights.
Utah Liability Reform Act Sections 78-27-37 to 78-2^-43
U.C.A. f!9R6) (Appendix 3)
Constitution of the State of Utah
1. Article I, Section 11 - open Courts.
2. Article I, Section 24 - Uniform Operation of Laws
3. Article XVI, Section 5 - Injuries Resultina in
Death.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Refer to Sullivan's brief in support of Petition for
Rehearing. Also, see the Court's summary of same in its
decision in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain et al., 211 U.A.R. a
(April 22, 1993). (Appendix 4)
SUMMARY OF WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND ARGUMENT
See IDENTITY OF AMICUS cttwt&b hereinabove where a
summary of the arguments is included.
ARGUMENT
1. THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH SHOULD GRANT A
REHEARING IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONTAINED IN THE
LANGUAGE OF THE TORT REFORM ACT OF 1986 AND
THE AFFIDAVITS OF SPONSORS OF THE LIABILITY
REFORM ACT OF 1986.
The Workers Compensation Fund refers the Court to
Sullivan's brief herein and also the brief of third-party
defendant CCC&T in the case of Brown vs. Bowman &Kemp et
al., Supreme Court No. 910082 which is still pending a
decision. The Fund asks the Court to reexamine the issue of
Legislative intent in light of the information provided
herein.
S.B. 64, the Liability Reform Act of 1986 was presented
by Representative Jack F. DeMann as the House Sponsor.
Representative DeMann explained to his colleagues:
...The reason we have a substitute bill is because
originally S.B. 64 attempted to change more of the
laws than joint and severable [sic]1 ...[TJhrough
seven hours of Senate Committee hearings the
proponents of the bill made several accommodations
to the plaintiffs' bar...The point that I am
making or trying to make at this time is that
concessions have been made...
Representative DeMann emphasizes by affidavit that the
Legislature did not intend to affect Utah's workers'
compensation system in any way whatsoever. (See Appendix 5,
*. Repreeentative DeMann'a use of the term aeveraiie ia meant to be
Affidavit of Representative Jack F. DeMann; and Appendix 6,
Excerpt of Taped Floor Debates, Utah House of
Representatives, February 26, 1986, General Session.)
Senate sponsors of the Liability Reform Act of 1986
(codified as §§78-27-37 through 78-27-43 U.C.A., 1986)
amplify on what was discussed during the seven hours of
debate in the Senate and express the clear intent of the
1986 State Legislature that employers conduct was not to be
compared to that of "defendants" and injured employees
seeking a third-party recovery:
*********
2. I was principal sponsor of Senate Bill 64
(hereinafter S.B. 64"), a proposed Liability
Reform Act. After my bill's initial version was
drafted and circulated among legislators and
interested parties, I became aware that the State
Insurance Fund (now known as the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, hereinafter "WCF") and
others had serious concerns about the affect the
proposed legislation would have on the Workers'
Compensation Act of Utah (Sections 35-1-1 et seq.
U.C.A.). We did not want to disturb in any manner
the present procedures and operation of the WCF or
Utah's workers' compensation system.
3. The concern with the original versions of
S.B. 64 as expressed to me by those parties was
that the language miaht permit comparison of an
employer's "fault" in arriving at verdicta in
third-party lawsuits.
******
5. Therefore, after further discussions with
interested parties and other legislators, S.B. 64
was amended to address those concerns. As part of
those changes, the term "defendant" was then
limited by definition to "...those not immune f-on
suit." (Section 78-27-37 U.C.A.).
6. To leave no doubt of the relationship of
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 to the Workers
Compensation Act, S.B. 64 included as proposed
Section 78-27-43 U.C.A. the language that nothing
in the Act was to "...affect or impair...the
exclusive remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter
******
9- It is my opinion that the Legislature
intended that employers be excluded from any fault
comparison so as not to alter the Workers
Compensation Act because their responsibility for
their injured employees was already provided for
in the Act. The Legislature did not want to do
anything that would affect the balance between
injured workers' and employers' rights as
contained in the Workers' Compensation Act of
Utah. Specifically, the Legislature did not want
to affect the "exclusive remedy" protection of
Section 35-1-60 U.C.A., the cost to employers of
providing no fault workers' compensation benefits
for their employees, or the subrogation right of
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.
(Affidavit of Senator Haven J. Barlow attached as Appendix
7) (Emphasis added.)
Co-sponsor for S.B. 64, former Senator Paul Rogers2,
echoes Senator Barlow's statement;
******
4. I have reviewed the affidavit dated the
19th day of May 1993 of Senator Haven J. Barlow
concerning the intent of the 1986 Legislature
. Former Senator Rogers has a contract with the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah to assist the Fund in matters dealing with the Legislatetre.
(hereinafter the "Legislature") in passing the
Act. From my personal knowledge I concur that my
intent and that of the 1986 Legislature was as
stated by Senator Barlow.
5. Also, I have read the Supreme Court of
Utah's decision in the case of Sullivan vs.
Scoular Grain Company of Utah, et al.f Utah
Supreme Court No. 910482. The majority opinion
therein determined a legislative intent contrary
to my intent as a sponsor of the legislation and
contrary to the intent of the Legislature. it was
never the intent of the Legislature for the
injured employee to bear the burden of the
employer's conduct alone by having the third-party
damages reduced by the employer's proportionate
"fault" and then requiring the injured worker to
reimburse the employer the full amount of the
subrogation allowed by Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. of
the Workers Compensation Act of Utah. Rather, the
amendments which became a part of the Act were
designed to make it clear that the employer'a
conduct was not to be compared to that of the
injured employee and the defendant Is) in a civil,
lawsuit. The employer's responsibility for all
their injured employees was provided for by their
participation in the no-fault workers compengaHnn
system.
(Affidavit of former Senator Paul Rogers, Appendix 8)
(Emphasis added.) (See also the affidavits of the following
legislators: Senator Arnold Christensen, current President
of the Senate; Senator Stephan J. Rees; Senator Eldon A.
Money; Senator Blaze D. Wharton; Representative James
Yardley; Senator John P. Holmgren; and Representative Brent
H. Goodfellow; Appendix 9.) (See also Affidavit of Dennis
V. Lloyd from Brown, supra., Appendix 10)
cc:
It is not sufficient to leave it to the legislature to
=rrect any deficiency or inaccuracy in the Court's
interpretation of legislative intent, as the Sullivan
majority suggested regarding the inequities attending
application of the reimbursement provisions of the Workers'
compensation Act in conjunction with this interpretation of
the Liability Reform Act of 1986. See Sullivan, 211 U.A.R.
3, 12 (April 22, 1993). There can be no legislative remedy
to Mr. Sullivan in this case, as any action by the
legislature will come too late to assist him.
Similarly, since any legislative correction of this
error will most likely have prospective application only, it
will provide no remedy to the myriad of plaintiffs whose
cases have accrued in the seven years since the enactment of
the Liability Reform Act of 1986. The hundreds or possibly
thousands of cases presently pending, accrued or yet to
arise will be adversely affected by this decision without
benefit of the correction when the legislature acts to
reaffirm the legislative intent misconstrued by the majority
herein.
The Worker's Compensation Fund urges this Court to
reexamine its interpretation of the legislative intent
behind the 1986 Act, and to modify its decision to conform
to the legislative intent so unambiguously stated.
2. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT A
REHEARING TO CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES IT DID NOT ADDRESS IN ITS OPINION
EXPRESSED HEREIN BECAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES WERE RAISED BY THE PARTIES; CONFUSION
AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION AT THE TRIAL COURT
LEVEL WILL BE AVOIDED; AND SO AS NOT TO UPSET
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION ACT OF UTAH.
The majority in Sullivan does not address any
constitutional issues. The Court will recall at oral
argument leave was granted the parties to supplement the
briefing. In basically an outline form, the parties
presented argument regarding constitutional issues.
The Utah defense bar is already advising its clients
that Sullivan is a landmark decision in which the workers*
compensation will be materially altered either judicially or
legislatively. (See letter dated April 28, 1993 from Tim
Dalton Dunn and Kendall P. Hatch to their clients, Appendix
11) Virtually every tort liability case originating from a
work-related injury stimulates the constitutional issues we
can only outline herein. The Fund urges the Court to assist
the trial courts of Utah to avoid the delays and the
burdensome litigation costs the parties in all such cases
will incur.
The Workers Compensation Act of Utah provides a
fundamental balancing of rights between employers and
employees. (See Appendix 12, Workers' Compensation Act, A
10
careful Balancing of Constitutional Rights) Each gave up
the right of a civil trial by jury to adjudicate their
respective rights. The replacement for each is the Workers'
Compensation Act of Utah. The Utah Act like those
throughout the United States went through a refining process
to establish a constitutional quid pro quo. See discussions
on constitutionality contained in Industrial Commission of
Utah v. Daly Mining Co., 172 P. 301 (Utah 1918); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L.
Ed. 366, (1923); and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 28 A.L.R. 1394 (1922),
affd, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923).
The Sullivan decision materially changes that balance.
Among other things, the changes include:
1. FAIRNESS. it is myopic to require the
determination of an employer's fault in the third party
civil litigation which is commenced by an injured worker.
Such a result focuses on issues of fairness within only of
two competing legal sub-systems, this is from the
perspective of third party defendants in a civil action. To
truly focus on the appropriate administration of justice,
the Supreme Court must step back and consider the
equilibrium which the Utah Legislature has established
between workers compensation as an entitlement system for an
11
industrial injury and civil litigation as a mechanism to
obtain redress for negligent conduct. The Legislature of
the State of Utah determines and correlates such issues of
equity between competing legal systems. Thus, legislative
intent is key and the Court should make every effort to rule
in such a way as to promote the smooth administration of not
one but both systems. In that light, Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion is clearly the correct view of the issue.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING. The heretofore equitable
balance of rights and remedies of Utah's workers
compensation system will be damaged by the Sullivan majority
opinion as:
A. The quid pro quo received by workers will be
changed...recoveries in third party litigation will be
reduced because of the employer's negligence, yet the same
employer still enjoys a full statutory lien which will
create a "chilling effect" on injured employees bringing
legitimate cases;
B. The quid pro quo received by employers will be
changed...in third party matters employers will be routinely
joined or feel compelled to join as defendants and subjected
to a process where the determination of their percentage of
fault is mandated. To maximize their subrogation recovery
12
and to protect their reputation, defense costs must be
incurred.
C. Heretofore predictable administrative
practices and legal principles which promote the efficient
and effective operation of Utah's no fault workers
compensation system will be called into question...
—There will be an effort to amend Section 35-1-62
U.C.A. as per Justice Durham's discussion the majority
opinion.
—There will be an incentive for injured employees
to attempt to breach the exclusive remedy of workers
compensation as the employee's third party recoveries will
be reduced and a determination of employer fault will be
mandated in third party litigation.
—The once nonadversarial relationship of employer
and employee while the employer is actually the "trustee" of
the employee's cause of action against third parties will be
turned into a massive conflict of interest the employer will
be torn between defending itself and representing the
interests of the injured employee against third parties.
The Court of Appeals has been called upon in recent
years to determine issues concerning the Constitutionality
of statutes of repose and of limitation contained in the
Workers Compensation Act of Utah, S535-1-1 et seq. U.C.A.
13
and the related Occupatlonal Oisease Act of utah, ^^
et seq. see Wrolstad v Industrial Coimission> 795 p^
-33 (Utah App. 1990); ,eiarde v m_ Qf Reviev ^ ^
"»'«, B3XP.2dl23 (utahApp. l992; Avis v_ ^^ ^
v. Industrial Co^ssion, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (utah Ap?
1»3,; Hales v. Industrial Comfflissio^ utah ^ ^ ^
(«ah App. 1993). In each lnstance< ^ ^^ ^ ^^^
discussed the role ot the Open Courts provision of the ut^
constitution in the Wor.ers• Cessation Act conterf and
applied the test enunciate. by this Court in Berry v. Beech
Mrcratt Corporation, 717 p.2d 670 at 68Q ((Jtah ^ =
an'in^rlfplrson an elective' and^ laW PrOVid"
alternative ranedv »h,, J nd reasonable
vindication ofhis constitut"? °f laW" for
substantially eguaT 7„ „ VMt1 fnt<Lmust_be
property, or reputation ,i?h: T !° one s Person,
substitute reaedy^ay^e K*^' ^ °f the
j. j. j. _i_ _•_ . . .
********
3 Utah constitution. Article T, Section ^ _^ ^^
before any tribunal in this star* f,
14
Second, if there is no substitute or alternate
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy Sr cluse
of actionmay be justified only_^fthere is a
(Emphasis Added)
The Court should apply the Beech two prong test to the
statutes affected herein.
Further, Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24,
Uniform operation of laws' and Utah Constitution Article
XVI, section 5 - Injuries resulting in death* - must
ultimately be examined as well. The Court should remember:
The plain language of Article XVI «5
compel[s] the conclusion that [a]'...fsitatute
unconstitutional insofar as it purports to bar th*
resuW fdeceased P<~s°n] •• ^Uled as a ^
bri „f -••[anf?er'S] ••• "^ligence from£n!™2 *"IT^1 death action against the[alleged tortfeasor] ... The constitutional
provision was directed at preventing the
Legislature from abolishing a right of action for
wrongful death, whether in a wholesale or
piecemeal fashion.
Malan v Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 667 (Utah 1984) fGuest
at^s^a^t^s-s,^ V- Beech ^crartX^Ta evo
operation"^1 ^^ °' * general nature ^all nave uniform
15
The standard enunciated by Justice Zimmerman in
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1988)
(at pg. 368) that the more important the constitutional
right infringed upon, the greater the burden is on the
proponents of the limitation to show its constitutionality
must be applied to this case.
...The burden then is upon the proponents of the
legislation's validity to demonstrate that its
restrictions on those rights are carefully drawn
and supported by weighty considerations.
The constitutional issues were introduced in this
action by defendants. Having opened those issues for
consideration, defendants now claim Sullivan and the Fund as
amicus curiae should be precluded from discussing the
constitutional issues.
Even if the defendants had not opened the area of
constitutional examination of the Liability Reform Act, the
Court should use its discretion to have such arguments fully
briefed because this case presents exceptional
circumstances. [See, State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920
(Utah App. 1991) and the cases cited therein.] That is
especially true when this matter comes to the Court not as a
final determination of all of the issues presented but
rather from a certification from the Federal District Court
of rather narrowly defined issues.
16
CONCLUSION
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah as Amicus Curiae
requests the Supreme Court to grant Sullivan's Petition for
Rehearing. There are essentially two bases for this
reguest. First, the Court did not have the opportunity to
fully examine evidence of the 1986 Utah Legislature's actual
intent regarding the Liability Reform Act of 1986. There
was extensive discussion regarding concerns the plaintiff's
bar of the State had with the original language in S.B. 64.
The affidavits of the legislators attached hereto make it
clear that those concerns were resolved by making sure that
employers' conduct is not to be compared with that of the
plaintiff and nonemployers.
Second, the Fund believes this Court should directly
address the constitutional issues raised or inferred in
Sullivan and the companion cases of Brown, supra, and Jodi
Dahl vs. Kerbs et al., Utah Supreme Court No. 910372 which
were consolidated for oral argument. Those issues have a
material bearing on the constitutional quid pro quo balance
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial courts need
this Court's direction to avoid needless delay and costs to
the parties.
17
DATED this 20th day of May, 1993
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Jajaei R. Black
sf
' /
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
By: /J64ut,A# llrA'A
Dennis V. Lloyd, x^erTeral Counsel
Attorneys for Wotkers Compensation
Fund of Utah
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APPENDIX 1
Affidavit of Rodney C. Smith
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
Dennis V. Lloyd, #1984
Attorney at Law
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone; (801) 288-8060
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN, *
*
Plaintiff, *
v.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF UTAH; * AFrTDAVTT OF
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, * RODNEY C. SMITH
a UTAH CORPORATION; THE SCOUL\R * IN SUPPORT OF WORKERS
COMPANY, ROBERT 0*BLOCK, and * COMPENSATION FUND OF
GORDON OLCH, dba FREEPORT * UTAH'S MOTION TO APPEAR
CENTER ASSOCIATES; TRACKMOBILE, * AS AMICUS CURIAE
INC., a GEORGIA CORPORATION, *
FORMERLY KNOWN AS WHITING CORP.; * Utah Supreme Court No. 910482
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE *
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a *
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
DELAWARE CORPORATION; OREGON *
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a UTAH CORPORATION; UTAH *
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a *
UTAH CORPORATION; AND G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
MISSOURI CORPORATION, *
Defendants. *
*
Comes now the Affiant, Rodney C. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. Affiant has been employed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
hereafter WCF, for over ten years and currently serves as Vice President.
2. Affiant by reason of his capacity as Vice President and in the normal course
of his duties has personal knowledge of the WCF's operations, as well as statistical data
related to such operations, and WCF's legislative interactions.
3. WCF provides worker's compensation insurance coverage for approximately
25,000 Utah employers or about 85 percent of the total number of employers in Utah.
4. WCF covers some 260,000 workers employed by the Fund's 25,000 insured
policyholders.
5. Affiant has personal knowledge that the effective operation of Utah's
workers' compensation system relies on a delicate balancingof rights between employers
and employees. A major component of that equation is the quid pro quo exchanged by
employers and employees whereby an employer provides statutorily mandated benefit
entitlements to injured employees in exchange for exclusive remedy protection from civil
suit.
6. Any judicial decision which discusses the wisdom, viability, or operation of
the exclusive remedy simultaneously impacts the very foundation of Utah's workers'
compensation system. By allowing an employer's negligence to enter into the
determination of third party civil liability and by funher calling into question the equity of
an employer's subsequent lien right under UCA 35-1-62, the Supreme Court has set the
stage for a needless disruption of the historical equilibrium ofUtah's workers'
compensation system.
7. Any major change in the workers' compensation system either judicially or
legislatively raises the probability of an increase in insurance premium rates or a reduction
in benefit entitlements with the ultimate potential of a collapse of the system whereby
employees will once again be able to sue their employers civilly when a workplace injury
occurs.
Dated this ^ day of May, 1993.
Rodney C. Srnith
Vice President
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
Subsaibed and sworn to before me this ltU*> day of May, 1993.
""""""notaryTubuc""^ f\ /) L^f
DEBRA A. NELSON
2323 East 2880 South
Sail Lake City, Utah64109
My Commission Expires 2/5/95
STATE OF UTAH
im^L
Notary Public
Residing at J^ (ftdu, C&ZcsJL,
My commission expires ^V^/t J
f:SMIL£N\DVLSULLMff
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APPENDIX 2
Section 35-1-60 U.C.A
and
Section 35-1-62 U.C.A.
oo-l-HO AB'lR •- :N[)rSTRJAI. COMMISSION'
Notice and opportunity to be heard.
'•'••'< -nt- .••mm::-.-. n ,-. . .._..... r . _
: r^r'..mr, •,, ;,.. ;ih. .r - -., . ,vr„ ^_ ,
•a i:-: i
<E<'ISIO\S
•n-,mi-.-,!on. -a-r.^,- iw.irc ha- n.-e- .--• \„.
.i-n-.t .iint-rvi :i- rlnc::'.^- .f:"ac:- ••>.;—-. .' —•"
-i: -mplmvr n„tKe lna |ln iDpi r..r .. ". '•'^
•rjr: LVnw i R<; \v rh •, iM^-~ ,
' 'mm n. ,-1 Ctan il'i J79 P olli ' H)l-
'LLAThRAL REFERENCES
<-'••'•*• • inn I'JS W,rKrnen- .'..n-p^
Hon -- >>3>i Key Numbers. - Worker, ComDer,^-..-
1 lTi-io
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer
agent or employee - Occupational disease ex
cepted.
^^^^:°mpenSaUOn PUTant t0 the Provisi0^ of this title for
.-June, sustained bv an employee, whether resulting in death or not <h,ll h.
the exclusive remedv against the employer and shall h* rh! .
=c^rrr:^:rdents' f «^^™£accident or nmA or Hp rh ' perSOn whoms^ver. on account of anv
liHIHiil
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, i 76; C.L. 1917
* 3132; L. 1921, ch. H7, * 1; R.s. 1933 & C
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52. * 1
Cross-References. - Employment of -ha-
dren ; .'{4-23-1 et 5eq
I.'tan Occupational Disease Disability Law
• 55-2-1 et .seq.
Meaning of "this act". - See the note un
der the same catchlme following ; 35-1-46
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
'• ompulsorv.
Effect ot" no-fault insurance
Err-,plover
-xi'iiisiveness of remedv
-Minor enya^ed in hazardous employment
r.irmers and domestics
H'j-pital charges.
Indemnification agreement between emolowr ,ind thira partv
Indemnity agreement. " P -
Intentional tort.
•Joint venture.
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I'ompuisurv.
I tah W'..rumen - I'omDriisitHdi Act :- <oln
pui.Mirv and not elective I.ovato v Beatrice
Fond.-. '3 Clah 3d 371. 453 1' 3d '313 R<h.(
Effect of no-fault insurance.
The N -r.tuit In-aram'e .\, t. '..rmer
• C-ll ! ••• .on aid not -uijor-ed.' >r r.mhrv
*!:'- W r:-.::,.•:: > C cn^-n^::. n A,i - -v.au-ive
:v!;i«'i:' or"'-i-;..n as uppard :<> n i;n.-- iron
rr.-cr vec.cie accident.-; -.j[R^r-ii an ih>- .••.•;».,.
^ .•mp...\menr IMF Freij.-.i. I:ic . Ott,.-en.
"^3- I' 3d J3h Ctah ',975
Kmployer.
Worker was employee of ,ab!e telcw-i-.n
coninair.. its -ub-adsury. mu :- .mated part
:i*t t.ir parpo-es ot tr.e exciu.-ive romod'. ih'om-
-i"n- ..: 'tie I'tah Workmen- t'ompen.-ati.-n
Au •>•. nen- ' he cable teiev :-ion company. .,-
part ot n-, management -tv :e grouped a.I .•m-
plovee-. T(;t:etner under ;t- direct control and
*herf rhr worker- rime -beets and check-
'aere managed by 'he '.'able 'elevision -am-
panv Freund v Ctah Power ,V Light. b35 F
Supp 373 .1) Ctah 19*c
Exclusiveness of remedv.
' i;iiiT 'hi- -ection n.iit'r, the iriiurv is cau-ed
av rne f.i-L'iit'.TH act H the -'mpiover. no wilful
mi-cor.da.t c.eirv Maimed, -he .mured .-m-
fun\et' r Alien the imurv .auses death r.:.-
ieo.mdent- mu-t he content m accept the cem-
per.-.nioti provided by the ait ilaiimt; v In
dustrial Cutnm n. 71 Ctah 113 'H3 F "«
1937
Since the enactment of the Workmen- Com
pensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of
an employee who is injured in the course of his
emtvo, mora i-, the right to recover the compen-
-.dii'ti prinidcd for :n 'he act O 55-l-i e! -eq
Murruv •. W'u.-atch Grading Co . 73 Ctan -l.'io
374 R 94D . 1H1>9.. Ortega v Salt Cake 'A',-,
W i-n L,i'jndr\ 0)S Ctah : 15b R 'd ••-5
CJ4"p
Employee ot nuiroad wa.- not precluded from
hung ::iairn tor ''ompensation hv application
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act
on i,Tiiund of election since employee did not
have two remedies but only one. if injury was
incurred •••.rule lie was engaged in interstate
commerce his remedy was under Federal Em-
piov.-rs laahiiitv Act and if not. ,t was under
cMRFN-Arh ,\
-t.ite ,nt i ran Idaho Cent R R •. Incu.-tna.
Oomm :i - I i tan 5f>4. .i'i P 3d M2. 94 A ' R
it: iHroL'ates emnlovee - comrr.'.n
''•"• '-mpiover for imune- -atfer.":
''-•'• •>: '-mDiovment .-xi.opt where
"•' -ntaei" to this act or .-nm:n..::-
I eniDMv^e is e.xpre-,--i'. 'e-ervei:
I'eri State- Smei'ane. Ret >y Min-
-- ''• '• 13 ' 'ah ;m]. 19: F 3d ^irj. atipeai
du-m;--ed ,.i5 I'S --bri. b9 S Ct ;3s <•.] L
Ed t i : i:q.v
Ihi.- -enion makes it clear that this chapter
:.- the e\Oii-r. e vehicle for recovery ofnmipen
-at ion lor iiiiurv or death, a^ain.-t the en.piover
.ind other emuinvee.- lo the exchiMon of .,r.v
ana ,nl .aner civil liability what,-,over. . t com
mon .a.v ..r o:herwi-,e. ana that :t hars all n,-\t
'I km t 'ie pen dents, or anyone e!.-e. from
u-int: anv ..tr.er means of recovery ayair.M ••:•.-
pimer- and -rhers named m and covered ;.v
the Act. than the Act itself Morrill v 3 & M
Con^tr Ce . o35 I1 3d -^ •Ctah 19HF
— Minor i-nnajjed in hazardous employ
ment.
Even it a minor employee ;s :ii[ured while
ensured .n h,i/ardou^ ernolovment in violation
•it - J4-33 3. protiihirmu ;f..- etapinv men' •:
minors .n -.a/ar-iou.- occupat.ai-. ;he min>,r-
i-M'M.-ive ri-:r.vc. :- through ;r.:- ihapttr and
r.he m.nor • annot void her >-rnDio\ment .-on-
:r;ict and -ue ;:i tort Hin '^ham v Ea^.^on i'orji
• n, P 3d b7~> Ctah 1965'
Farmers and domestics.
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the
e\ent ot an accident or injury, are entitled to
pur-ue their ••ommon-law remedies :n in ac
tion uL'uin.-.t the empioyer because they are ex
:epted trom the act by ;; 35-1-43 ar.d 55-i 43
Murrav •. Strike. 7b Ctah 1H 3«7 R •)•.">
I:.t3i)'
Hospital charges.
I he i.:i.-. power t^iven the Industrial Com-
mi--ion in the workers compensation st itutes
over ho.-pital .-barges for services rendered to
injured emplovee> is the right to refuse to pav
that part ot them which is excessive in amount
or tar care which whs not reasonably neces-
-ar\. lnd'„-tr:ai Commission does not ha.'p the
power and authority to set maximum rates
1433 195
Ti::- -e<
.aw r:Lt:t
'•C".l:- a'. •
err.pln'. >r
.aw 7-".:\>-'
Ma-n:. •,
191
o5-l-60 LABOR - INDCSTRIAL COMMISSION
wr.:;h hospitals mav charge :Cr services r>-r.-
i^n-'i ircured employees, and ho-pir,-.i- ar>' n-t
:r ram ted :rom holding m :re urea err.pi'.'1.>-"
...: >• i"r ,iny amounts not paid r-v ;h>- ..".mmi--
-.•:-. .r.N-rm >untain Health Care Im. '- 3".d..--
••:... > mm n, 657 P 3d 13-3 Cran >-J
Indemnification aprpement between em
ployer and third party,
W:>->•.' .-mtv. >-r .ind third D..rty vmur.tarie.
enter :r.i..' .1 -r.rten .ndemnification ^gree-
mer.r wntreoy the employer agree- to indem
nity '.he third parly against claims arising out
.t .n ones to the employer's employees, and
'•vr.t-re an employee is injured and ;s compen
sated by the employer in accordance with me
workers' compensation law. the exciu.-ive rem
edy provision of this section does not preclude
rhe enforcement of the indemnification agree
ment by the third party against the emp.over
for amounts paid by the third party to the em
piovee as a result of the imurv Shell Oil Co v
Br.r.kerhoff-Signal Drilling Co , 656 P 3d 11ST
Ctah 1983'
Indemnity agreement.
An :naemnity agreement is a separate un
dertaking by the employer that will be enforce
able despite workers' compensation :f the in
demnity provision expressly covers the indem
nitor's employees, but the phrase "person or
persons'' does not cover indemnitors "wn em
ployees given the dramatic consequences ot
-uch an interpretation Wollam v Kennecott
Corp, 663 F. Supp. 368 'D Ctah 19o7'
Intentional tort.
Rrovi.-ion prohibiting action for damages
against fellow employee does not prohibit
maintenance of action for premeditated ar.d in
tentional act of fellow empiovee Brvan \ . Ctan
Int'l. 533 P2d 892 iL'tah L975'
Joint venture.
Construction company obtained contract to
construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered
into agreement with corporation by which the
two organizations would unite their efforts to
complete such construction and share m profits
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by
the construction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel and who obtained
workmen s compensation benefits, could not
sue corporation for alleged negligence of corpo
rate employees since the two companies were
regarded as the employing unit. The employees
of both companies were engaged in the same
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co , 15
Ctan 2d 20, 386 P 2d 616 -1963'.
This section barred suit by workmen against
joint venturer which was his employer for inju
ries sustained in use of machine furnished by a
second joint venturer, where machine was fur
nished pursuant to contract creating the joint
Liability to third parties.
'Ah--r>- - l....-.tiff" emu..,>,.,. w •- --. an
••-..-•. a--!--' 'idir.i.- into -,-,e -.d>- ..[ .i rr
' r uc"'--' .-.n acrum ,igain.-t rhe raaroad
rn in..:.'tr irer 3 the i-ros-mg -una,
'.<rg..ger.r »pKeep and orocu.r i.-t-.-:;
'.r.eiv -.either iefendunt cuu.d . ,r. ['
>*tr.Di...vcr ..•.- a third-party detendant ,r,
^.-.-err ,.i iaim lor contnbut; ;n from it uncer
the '.nr rort-teasor -tatute Curtis v Harmon
E;«: Inc: . 152 P2d 117 Ctan C376'. Phaaos
v l':-.:,;n Pac KR, bit P 2d 353 Ctan 13-U'
deeded under prior law'
Nature and adequacy of act.
The workers compensation -cheme :-. purely
-tatutcry ana rhe act i jo-1-1 et -eq pro
vide- a main, speedy, and adequate method of
review Wo id berg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74
Ctan J09. 279 P. 609 1929'
Negligent injury by employee of same em
ployer.
Where -ubcontractor was an 'employee" )f
contractor, other employee ot contractor could
not maintain negligence action against subcon
tractor hut must look to workers ccmDensation
insurance Gallegos v Stnngnam. 21 Ctah 2d
159 442 P 2d 31 '196f>;.
Occupational disease.
Administratrix of deceased citv empiovee,
who died 'rom inhalation of paint he was or
dered "•! -Drav on trucks, couid bring an action
at Ciw against the emplo>er. ~'.r.c^ -uch was
net an accidental injury compensable under
this act ^ 55-1-1 et seq \ but was an 'xcupa-
riona. disease" Young v Sal; Lake C.tv 97
Ctan '.23. 90 P 2d 174 '1939'
Statutory employer.
—"Sufficient control."
W3iere >oint owners of interests ;n oil and gas
leases provided for construction of a gas pro
cessing plant located in Ctah. to be operated as
a 'mutually profitable venture ' for the purpose
•-if extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under
the operating agreement the owners reserved
the Dower of ultimate control over the proiect
and over the operator thereof, the owners re
tained "-ulTicient control" to qualify as statu
tory employers of an employee or the operator
pursuant to l 35-1-42- 2' and the exclusive
remedv provision of this -ection applied. Lamb
-. W'-Lnergv. Inc., 665 F Supp. 395 D Ctah
19-7
Subcontractor's employee.
Suhcontractor's employee couid not recover
from general contractor in civil action for inju
ries on theorv that subcontractor was his em-
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-61
Aer and general contractor wa- a third per
•i not m 'fe -ame "iripiov mont Mratr. v Al
•d Uriiwn Co . 27 Ctan 2d 155. 193 P 2d -19-1
This -eaion does not forbid or render invalid
; . Ja use in a eor.-truct ;• u: -aheontract In whan
•he -uncontractiir agreed to indemnify the
anme nmtracMr ind -ave him harmless tor ail
.a'natv arising ,,ut "I the injurv or death ot an
•aai'lo--"" ,t -uhcorilractor. where such riause
.-\i-i.-d aid decedent workman'-: admini-tra
trix -ued prime contractor for wronglui death
ot decedent and recovered, thereto re. dece
dent - emolover is required to reimburse prime
contractor covered by workmen's compensation
as provided in such indemnity clause Iitan
Steei Corp v. W'aiton. 365 F 2d 5-12 •10th Oir
1966'
Tort liability of employer.
— "Dual capacity" doctrine.
Ctah law does not recognize as an exception
to the exclusive remedy provisions ot the
Worker's Compensation Act. the so-called
"dual capacity" doctrine under which an em-
plover, shielded from tort liability by the act,
may become liable in tort if he occupies, in ad
dition to his capacity as employer, a second ca-
pacrv 'hat cnfers ,,n him an obligation mde
pendent 'I 'h.-se .moused on ram ..s an ••m-
pluver Wwrtm-r. v Ka-nnecott Curp , 7-'t! F 2d
-56 C'th C,r 1 9,-5 '
\n 'inoa',.'.' cannot hold his employer liable
,n tort tor aranes resulting trom the em
ployer.- maintenance ot unsafe premises, on
the reasoning that the employer occupies a sep
arate capacity and owes -eparate duties to hi-
employees is an owner ot the premises, -ante
the empiovers dutv to maintain a sale work
place is inseparable from the employer's gen
eral duties as an employer toward his em
piovee.- Bingham v Lagoon Corp.. 707 P 2d
67,^ • Ctah 1985'
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a
products liability claim brought on behalt ot a
decedent who was killed when he was pulled
into a large -crew-auger manufactured by de
fendant while decedent was working on his em-
plover s premises, where the employer had not
assumed a separate and distinct obligation to
ward his empiovee other than as employer
Stewart v CMI Corp.. 740 P 2d 1340 'Ctah
',9*7 i
Cited in Smith v Atlantic Richfield Co . 814
F2d 1481 '10th Cir 1987"
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brinham Young Law Review. — Ctah Al
lows Contribution Against Co-tortfeasor De-
spue Immunity from District Suit Bishop v
Niei.-en. 1982 BYL'L Rev. 429
C.J.S. — 101 C J.S. Workmen's Compensa
tion ; 918.
A.L.R. — Insured's receipt of or right to
workmen s compensation benefits as affecting
recovery under accident, hospital, or medical
expense policy. 40 A L.R 3d 1012
Workers' compensation law as precluding
35-1-61. Repealed.
empiovee s suit against employer for third per
son s criminal attack, 19 A L.R.4th 926
Workers compensation act as precluding
tort action for injury to or death of employee s
unborn child, 55 A.L.R.4th 792.
Wailful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coem-
plovee as ground of liability despite bar of
workers compensation law. 57 A.L.R.4th SriH
Kev Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
j= 208-1
Repeals. —Section 35-1-61 iC. 1943. Supp.. ploved minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch
42-1-57-10, enacted by L 1945, ch. 65, J) 2'. 76, - 11
relating to injuries to or death of illegally em-
193
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3o-l-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em
ployee of said employer —Rights ofemployer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte
nance of action —Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
U^ZuZ^y °r deathkfor/vmch compensation ,s payable under thishan^n 2n been./£auiea by the "ronsful act or neglect of aperson otherthan an employer, officer, azent. or empiovee of said employer, the injured
"u r^V" ^ °^ea,th h" dePendents- ™>' claim compensation and the
acno VrT ^ °r heir\orPe«^l representative mav also have an
action tor damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
.he employer or insurance earner becomes obligated to pav compensation the
IZr. y^rwTanCB Car,ner ShuaU become trU?tee of ^ ^se of actionagain,, the third party and may bring and maintain the action either m its
wn name or ,n the name of the injured empiovee. or his heirs or the oer^ona
euHr!r 7 ^ ^ ^^ pr°Vlded the ^l^ 0r <»™ mav nosettle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission
Be ore proceeding against the third party, the mjured empiovee. or. in case of
death, his heirs shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding
lror_the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec
tion JD-i-42. the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative mav
al,o maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac
tor,, ^dependent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death
II any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
loi lows:
•1' The reasonable expense ot the action, including attorneys' fees
.nail be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is ,o be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured empiovee or mthe
case or death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
p a rtv.
•2- The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in lull tor all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys tees provided for in Subsection •1 >.
3= The balance shall be paid to the mjured empiovee or his heirs m
case ot death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full anv obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
> 3133. L. 1921. ch. 100, * 1; R.S. 1933, ch 67 * 7- 197s ,-h mi s t
42-1-58; L. 1939. ch. 51, * 1; C. 1943. 42-1-58; 101' * 3'
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Intentional injury in telluu emtiieaee
'••:[•• wri'iirc
"•»'•' :• :'iTi''!i hi heirs
K. .::.'•.r-n.ent
1 "iM'i.Mtiur.
^i" '" ''••" "i '.;n::n.--i..n
"' -'• ::i-arance :ur,u
"•'IITi^iUllIl
I'liini |i;inv liability
i .ted
Vtion against tort-feasor prior to compen
sation award.
f .n ' 'hit ••'•iirKn-.i.T, - •m::i;h-:;-,;: :.iii , :a :>::,:•-••
'''';"'' •'•''h rhira-parfv ii,r: -:.-as< r j..r -am
't J' r i.'iar. an\ comnen-at iun ,,v..a'd -he ,.u,d
'••'•••• re,|.,v..ci. before illir.j . i-mp.Ti-a: ;-n
1..aia ilnl not reiie\e ,'nnipi'i:-atmn in-arer .i!
luf. t.i pav claimant award mllniin^ n, pn>-
P"H lunate share of attorney's {,-,•-, <Iraharn v
!ru:u-(nai Cumin n, Jb Ciafi Jd (Ji 4Hl P Jd
Applicability of section.
1' •- -'C n appn^v ur,!\ ;.• -,
i-um-'T- .aii) are !V>t "miif a er-
'<i -Taiaiur1. cmpiover- Lanit. ••
'••'•' '^-!- y Supp :j95 j) Ctah :r'-7
Assignment of cause of action.
I- acuun had been commenced against a
'laid person to recover for the injuries urdeath
-it applicant, such action must first haw- been
--.aa."'! :u -tate insurance fund as a condition
y'*"'":'-m to application and.a' W,,t Kma-riS
• "naaa;s,.!ion Ac: Robinson v Indu-ina:
' 'fn.-T-i a 72 Ctah Ji).'i J6h> P 7I.S la '-•
Where -anplovee was killed in ,uur-e a ;;;-.
' :l:i'I",-me:ii hv wron^ul .u-t ,.| "bird per-ai
^•da widow chose to cianr, comnen.-.n urn mder
•"' Workmen s (.'ompen.-atiun Act. out :u-r
••iinur child chose to sue under former -.ectu-n
•'•' which action widow declined to join, as as.
•lajiment ni cause of action hv widow >o em-
I'"'w,r A''^ sufficient, an assignment bv ;he
''-in .r a.ls n(K necessarv An a.-.-uninen- was
•<<>• —,;>•. irny wrien compensation ^ j.
.a_r.un-t
Kr.iTL".
'f- \-Ai|. ,\
'in *n>
.'.•rri>T r,r iaau'd
'n,a i 'i.;n::i a -11
\ I. K -».",:' la ,;,
, u A'j- •' ' !,n'J;t...;n precedent <, the .m:i-
piuvees :-]U-nt i,) L,aim cumpeiisatiun from m-
-n:i)i..\er -Miere iie was iniured hv netrlmmte
"I -aneone not his empiover. that he should
a.s.sic;!i his action for damages against the
'.vrunjener Industrial Comm n •. Wasatch
«if.idiriLj; ( '.. sii Ctah 22.i \ 1 1' Jd a-s p).!j
( onstruction of statute.
It;;~ -'L'tiun .••wr> tioin .,ct.v,- .!•](] [,a--;'.e
n.'.Jl.j.aice l,,r.ar>ur. v I'uaara. t'uCKai^- C,,
•"' i "-'ti i: 1. : 7J p 2d '- CM4.
\U:ere -tale insurance land paid dUTipens,,-
'•"" Ti maired person, tne insurai ce carrier
ha.s a .,ause ,,f action where the npurv was
caused hv third person, hut this does nn. rnt.an
that it had the nnlv cause of action Mnce this
section ai-u ^ives ;he injured per-on a ••ause of
acti-a ai;airw the third nersun RotrnKki v
I'.".iilips l'etrni,..;ni i\, . j Clah Jd Ju i J>c'
C Jd Jni j;,-):,,
Costs and attorney fees.
•M'"1' -''pl-eme .'uLirt Jtci-imb :hat perrnt!
•I''." itturne'. fee, :r, be deducted !r>m
"r'ion at recovery gained ;n ^sanituirsf
state insurance lund do not apply retroactive!v
to tees determined in reliance on fie former
rale Draper v Travelers Ins Co . -IJ!) F Jd 1-1
*":•• ('.r CCrili. Wdliams v Ctah State Hep t
"f i-in J.J Ctah Jd 4dS. 464 P Jd .Viri 1;jT* i•
Alth.nmh .usurer was entitled to reimburse-
that
1 95
ap.". i-r t n.- iii-ur 1:1,
•ttunv\...,(: Dair. v Iraja-
an ;-,h 14 P Jd JU -
:
.'J">-Ui2 LAH.JR - IXDCSTRIAL i'OMMISS.jn
1 -ar.se
a a: .e
V'l.l!
"'•',:(' ": "'as, r.,:i!e at: -,..,•
•lainiata in Ta.an;--- -.e>'C-'
P^v .r-.asrriuch ^ defendant
A'<- rfa.e'.e-i :"r •-, .-.arcer. ,,{
claimant Pre'tvman v L'va
~". irrit-::' a-
"" •> pr--, rata
-- mcurr'-c ny
-t with -.rard
isarance 'and
'•'i nl: .-.ward to
-Tate i)eD '. uf
Km . J7 Ct
Where ,,n
Jd <,.]:]. 496 P Jd
'Urea person who rids conected
A'ot-Kmer. „ corr.o-n.-.mor. sues tnira-p.rt;, tort-
mtired person and tr.e -ubro-
arrier htnr their prxiortion-
and attorney fees incurred m
ry in :,,rt -ui: Lr,,.-.;^
C|M" - h> '"f -';- amend-
'•dea to eliminate priur ur.cer-
t clear :hat .rearer -noald
'easor bcih t ,Tj
jated in-urutia-
ate -iiare of co-t
•li'taaiin^ '"ecu1,
added 'u Suhd:',
merit was in;
tdinfv and a;
n*''»r :ts prun-rt.mate -hare, and insurer .an-
"ot avoid ;t- ,nare of e.xnenses bv hiring lts
';wn ('oun^1 '<™ -otifwng miured iier-on of
that tact Lamer v Pyne. J9 Ctan Jd J49 7,0*
C -id .!« 197.'C
Disbursement of recovery.
—Medical expenses.
I ummissivn pr.Deriv .nterareted
•inv animation ' :n SuDsectiun 3
medical .-xper.^s Tavior v
'omnia. 743 P Jd :iS,J Ctah 19-7
"Dual capacity" doctrine.
lUih iaw doe- not recogn;.:e a- jr. exceDtion
'o trie exclusive remedv provisions if rhe
Worker, t omnensation Act the <o-cai!eri 'dual
cacacitv doctrine under wmen an empiover
-hielaed tram tort liability ,ov the act mav" be
come uahle in tort it he occupies, in addition to
bis capacity i^ employer, a second caoacitv
'-nat confers on mm an obligation .r.deDenoent
•H 'hose imposed on him as an empiover
Wnrthen v Kennecott Corp 7*ii F 2d '«5H
1(11h Cm 19,s,-i ' '
An empiovee cannot held his employer hanle
;n tort -or injuries resulting from the em-
plover s maintenance of unsafe premies ,n
the reasoning that the employer occume- a -ep-
arate capacity and owes separate dutie- • • ms
employees as an >wner or the premise- sinCr
the employers duty to maintain a -ate v,orK
place is inseparable from the emolover s ^-p-.
''ra: duties as an -mpiover toward hi- em-
plo;.ees. Bingnam v Lagoon Corp "Vr p ja
HTS .Ctah 19»5'
Election of remedies.
Where c:tv policeman was injured nv third
~.t- nhrase
to .nciude
Industrial
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-dice . >mm-
•'I acTlur. t i ,•;;
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! ion from , :t
1'omm n. -] i
Kmniuvfre "
tiling claim t
filed under
on ground
-a.t L.
r mi a as r...t ;.r>-.
'inpensatmr. "v .
ederai Emnm'.ers [__,.
election slnL.e ,Jrnp| ...
have two remedies but jnlv ..me .:"
incurred while he v-as -f-i:aj„,-1 „
commerce h.s remeav was^ei- Fecer v Fm-
plovers l-iamiitv Act. if nca ,: wa-a-ov- -* *-
act. Ctan Idaho Cent RR •_• I-,ci• •-r r-' a•
Commn, 54 Ctah .364. 35 PJd -4 ' ">7X I P
1423 • i9.CC
In a case in wrucr. fireman wa- k\'~" K v.,
lapse of a ladder while in the oermrma'ree ',(
his dutv his dependents cou.d exe--e -t-.-r
right to elect under terms ofthis ^-•••n ••, nur
sue their remedy against third-carv wrong
doer Hamiiton v Commiss.on V.f '-' - ' i.,s
Ctah 574. 162 P 2d 758 •1945.
Intentional injur>- bv fellow empiovee
One wno is injured bv the intent;. - u"i - ..r ,
tellow empiovee mav seeK recover, :,r lam-
ages as provided for in thi- se<-:;c,n Hr -r. •
I'tah Int'l. 5J3 P 2d ^90 L-uh ^-^
Joint venture.
Construction commanv obtained ;TtP.- -,,
construct diversion tunnel at dam and enva-a
into agreement with corporation bv wni.r --
two organizations would unite their eff-r<s .„
complete such construction and share :n •jncV-
-r tosses from fine enterprise. Miner 'hmeYov
the construction comDanv. wr.o wa~ r. •-ea
while working on the tunnel, and whrn obramed
workmen 5 compensation benefits, coa a nu-
sue corporation for alleged negligence jf'-orpo-
rate employees since the two" companies were
regarded as the employing unit. The empiov^s
ot both companies were engaged in -he same
employment Cook v Peter Kiewit Sons f.j "5
Ctah 2d 20. 3S6 P.2d 616 '1963.
Nondependent heirs.
Legislature did not intend to divert -he n^ht
ot heirs to damages under the wrongtul death
statute it they are nondependents ana received
no compensation nenefits Oliverasv Cdnbuu-
^our Corners, Inc., 598 P Jd 1320 Ctan ;y79'
Pleadings.
Complaint by assignee should allege Dav-
ment ot the award Johanson v Cudahv Pack
ing Co.. 101 Ctah 219. 120 P 2d 281 " '941
Complaint was sufficient to state a cause of
action tor negligence in action bv depenaems of
a truck driver who was killed when he backed
a truck into some high tension electric wires
.1 r.u;
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]{< irntiursement.
-• •- ' " ut it A,l- i.-Cil.v :.|.g.,:e<: -.. pav
. : •-'; :.i. (' •mm n \ '.V.w.n h i waning < .. -n
i '.in .2 1. : } p Jd .,--, u, ;j.
loomed employee', settlement and release
•a .' b at - private insurance carrier. under unin-
- .red motorist .overage did :iu; ufi'ect claim ••!
-' i'" ..".-urance tuna VVurkers ( '..m;,en.a'...ai
:' •"• - a_[.ar.st tnirn rartv < >n. b-a-er mci in-
ai-l erraauvee was n..i repaired 'u Mar-arair-e
.'. ; lui ••v.TKrr.en - .- •rr.peti-.-.tji.n oer.ef:'- ;vad
••:m Soutriea-t I an '',, . iiarr-'t' Jl
I "'an j(i J I. 465 P Jd i lh CT i'
l::.:d part'. w.i- r.i.r entitled '.• have arr.uun;
•I a igment awarded .n;ured empl .vee reduce.]
.v* amount ul workmen - coinpen.sal ion benefits
paid to employee, third parts 's contentions
mat employer ai-o wa.- negligent that msur-
•r. e 'om.fianv stood .:; -hue- ..t >anpiuver and
•".-'•ijaen'Iv that m.-urer -tanfid nut recover
a"-.am ut compensatiun paid imamc ••moio-vee
mooted ."exaco, Inc v Pruitt C*6 F Jd Ji7
i''' h <'.r C-"s,- •
'be purpose of rhe right •;) reimbursem--::'
"-'aT'.i-ned by this -ect ion :- ..-Cv -,, ;-revent
h able recovery h\ the empiovee nr his .,r tier
deiieruients Allstate Ins t'o v Hfis.-,. 725 P 2d
13 id Ctah 1986.
—( 'ompensation.
1 "mpensation ai>h:n :h<> meaning -t this
-'".•':•.n a-, nmired ro amount.- .aairr.ed hv me
'"•l""' '*'' '>r the dependent- AiKtate In- C>
P'i:--. 725 P 2d 1 j.jM [ 'tah ;h-h
' -'-'' Cxed pav menr made under
• • -I '^J a1, when .t i.- determined that a
do'-ea.sed employee had no dependents. ;s not
•ompensation" within the meaning of this sec
tion, and where the decedent's parents sued the
!"i'T teasor and its insurer, the insurance lund
1aid neither invade The parents recover-,- nor
oursue a -ep,irate claim against the insurer in
rder To recover the amount paid ,nto ihe Sec-
"i'-il In.urv Fund Allstate Ins t'o v Rh--. 7J5
P Jd 1330 Ctan lO.id
Sumo employment.
Neither subcontracti.r placing Timbers ,n
dome ut large building nor materialmen -up-
plving -catl'olding for use in construction was
engaged 'in the same employment'' as em-
niovee ot general ^instruction contractor '.'--r
' ui.diag within meaning of this sectaa, Peter
-• i -•••a t;\; a. .
::i!>,iiv iii»-:il t-
'he'a ..-ai .nil- rig .v..vs -t,aa:a _'e- :,• ..;,•-.
•r.;. r'-aa-'i'. •.*.,!.- ina.-r VCr^m. n - < •::.;•;:-,
l.on A, i Xdain-un v i Jkiand i '.ai-ir ' .. 2\-
Ctah Jd J.,6 al)* P Jd hU,5 ' I973i
'A here decedent empiovee ut general ,...;r.rai
Tur a a- eiei trocuted. alleged! v •hf.ug:; a'/. -
g"M -• ut -atH'untractur, in accidi ra _ .rrmg
!';;,':' ':' * ' • ' ••mendnient . •[' ;).: -. -e, ;,. ;, .,,>,
in:ra,t..r a,,- ,n -ame emnluvna-:!- .-. ;.....
•!>•:.t irider : .5-1-4J. arm roar- a, -, : r, .
••-•l(,d •[' en ria.nraining '.vcncT i. ie n". ,c
' '":; -s.:it>t .t :n prova-i,,-;-. .t i •' ; ,.,,
Mnn.e . W',,s,ir.cn Flee t u . 516 P J.l -^6
Ct,.n : '»7C•
Whi-re jilaintitfs deceiient arm another were
teiluw employees at time of accuien: i ha - „-(.
ti«'n prohmited action bv plaint rfagain-^ ••-.>•
feli'.w empiovee and simiianv apa; f.|>ed ':>-
leteraiani Trum :oinmg T.e tedic ,.:•;.,,,.,,., ...
a •uint '"rt r--a-or tor purposes ,a v. frL> .i;; -,
l"-ii!,|is v Cruun Pac R R -;i i p j,: ;;,•' ' >.iri
'. 9>i'
Settlements.
— Approval of commission.
Ihis -ectmn does not require that :be . an
mis.-,iun ipprove empiovee in mated -e"
ment- The commission is reijuired *,, anrt s-
Hmoluver-initi.ited settlements ,n .rder '• ;:: .
•eCt The intere-t r-i "he -mpiuVe.' a. 1 '•>.-'.. r •
The emniuver tram entering .nn ., -,•::.,-t., ••:
'hat oiace-. the i-mp..,',er- w.atare .n.,,;.. ;;•..•,
"1 the .-inDluvee That •on;ern ,s r.ut ;,:.. i
when it i- the -mpiovee v-nr, -etta-s me -:..:
laviur •. Industrial Cornm n. 71.i P Jd il^.i
Ctah 19,i7'
State insurance fund.
State insurance fund 'Workers' Cumper.sa
Hon rural' had no right to recover tor compen
sation iienetits paid out of mat p.irt ot a wr r.g-
rul death recovery due Tu heir- ^nu na<:
•-•ived no workmen s .•omaiensatiun i.er.etlt-
'diver,,.- •. t'annuu-Foar Curner- [oc ", •-
C Jd 1 iJ" Ciaii :9~'J-
Subrogation.
Where -mulovee's original iruurv was aggr i-
vated hv phvsicians malpractice, irisuran.e
carrier was subrogated to employee's actual
against the physician; but if a greater annum;
..vas recovered than that paid empiuw-e m ,u:n
peiisatiun. the empiovee was entitleu ;.. r
19'
35-1-63
Raker •. Wv, ,tT
:J3-.
I.AB"R - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
'--•"• -•,l' ''•' I' -•: •' Emc:'i'.ir'.:an.i-.iTirv-ja.o:-c r.v;a —
work was -;n'e..t "o -ne c r.'r . : ''.>• g.ai'-r.a
;..ikci..- did '"r : "r -'-^ "••- I '•'-•- - !':- - ••• :•'•--• ••' ••:
the rem- ...mie as m.ni :,j.i-\\ .nut r mi- -eraun ..onir.;.i r .-m.tr. ; A.:r -•: :•' r. a :: < _ .' 1 "am
lor deam ••:" : nrrac: r- -r:c ..-.--e aiu.-rd bv Jd 15.). iJ i P _d -'^4 CJ7c
unsare : na::: n -\ -•......-.-,..- -tevn..- v i'.alo-
radu Fa,, i Inm _ l • -,a _a _1 i. -169 P Jd 3 < ited in Smitr. •. At.an:.: R.mrC •; , . -:i
Third-party liability.
F Jd 1W ;am
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.rJ.S. — l'1'! (.' -I > Workmen- Compensa- Right to maintain ma.rcracr ice -u:* igair.-t
tiun ; y.i et sec injured empiovee s attending -ra -..., m •!••!
A.L.R. — I.r.insured motorist L. verage va- withstanding receipt o: w..r.-;rr.en s „• ,:r-.:ier.-,;
liditv and effect n poncy pnv..-i.t, purporting Uon dwara. JS A L R 3d >66
to reduce coverage by ..muar.t paid under Kev Numbers. - WorKer- •• '• m^a.-ari'.n
workmen s compensation .aw J4 A L R.3d ^ >]^
1369
35-1-63. Judgments in favor of commission — Preference.
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by the commission or hv
the state under the authority of this title shall have the same preference
against the assets of the employer as claims for taxes.
History: L. 1917. ch. 100. ; 71; C.L. 1917,
J) 3135; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943. 42-1-59.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Extent of preference.
Judgment meeting requirements uf this sec
tion is oniy given a preference equal to the
preterence ot tax claims m damnation of as
sets and is not given same status as a tax iien;
accordingly, /adgment it Industrial Commis
sion tor msarar.ce premium is r.1.1 '-::' 'lei •
be paid out ot proceeds •-.{ sua-/ uf m r'ga^'.i
real estate ahead u'. prior rr.urtL'aeree C"iai Re
aity Co v Steele 3d Cta.n 4^.- ^J i'cd "..":.-
1936..
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — LOO C J S Workmen s Compensa
tion i 638
Key Numbers. - Workers i'umper.-
*= 1765
35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three days after
injury unless disability extended.
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury i~
received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse
and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses, provided, how
ever, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more than fourteen da\-.
compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the mjurv :-
received.
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APPENDIX 3
Utah Liability Reform Act of 1986 aka Senate Bill 64
Sections 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 U.C.A.
' -' -':,r> dCDK IAL :"• OF.
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured per
son — * otiee of rescission or disavowal.
Xutice a! cance.lat:or. or notice disavow m^ a Sterne-' •• -•• ^
given when it ;> deposited in a mailbox. pr^DeKv acarV-^^tV .,•,.!•. -~
prepaid. Notice ot cancelation given bv the inured rt."--. - -v„c '•• .'•'.• V*"'
particular form and i> sufficient if it indicates r>v --nvVorm"* w—Cn ,'Xm- '
sion the intention of the injured person not to" be bound o. •h'v'X- a-.',' -
agreement, iiamiitv release, or disavowed statement " '
History: L. 1973, ch. JAM. .- 4.
'• NLLATERAL REFERKNYL.-
Am. Jur. 2d. - r-n Am J- Jd Release * 14
L.J.S. -- . •> ' .j > Re.ej.se : !-> et seq
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi
tion to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be ;n add::; .•;; -., a:a: ••• • •
lieu of. any r:ght> of rescission. rule> uf evidence, or pr.u >;,..-.. .",,.,-..<
existing in the law
History: L. 1973. ch. 2<IH. ; 5.
Meaning of "this act." — .^e note follow-
inn .-dme i-atchane .:: n ;te- r,; ; 7-,-J7-,SJ
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 7ri-27-37 through 76-27-43
'1 Defendant" means any person not immune from sue
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking":'
'2' 'Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty. act. or
proximately causing or contributing to mjurv or damage.- su.-tu;
person seeking recovery, including, but not'limited to. ne^.e'er,
its degrees, contrioutory negligence, assumption of risk. ~tnc: '
breach ol express or implied warranty of a product, product.- i:un:.i
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
i3i Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking dan:.
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for w'r.-
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37. enacted bv L. acted bv Laws \q-] c~
1986. ch. 199. %I. ' dirr.inishrr.er.t
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws: 1986. ri.K an;
ch 1989.: 1 repea.s former :- 7-.J7-T, as en-
reenacts trie an
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•.ed 1'
Cited a. Deat.s •. ( an,:;•>••-
;4D P Jd :\:>: ; !.,!. < : Ap:,
I!-' !-;ia.AM-'t >{'< !'K< A :SI' )N>
V >TE- L'i :iR' I-sl' >\'S
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporaiy Law. ror A.L.R.
.'cmnamt. 'The laalanf. Remrm Ac: An Ap- V- ALR 1th J.sJ
rr'iach to F.'iui'.aba' Application ' see Li ._!
l\ nternp L -H 19>7.
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery bv that
person. Pie may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
:111 v tn one -;r;i['k nv gui:' nail
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
'."*fi. ch. 199, ) 2.
peals and Reenactments. — Laws 19*6.
..'9, s J repeal- former . 7h-27-.)8. as en-
-cted by Laws 1973. ch J'ly. ; J. relating to
-pecial verdicts, ana reenacts the above sec
tion
Cross-References.- Product Liability Act.
manulacturer or seller not aabie it alteration
or modification of product after -aa' :- substan
tial contributing cause ot' imur.. : 7->-La-a
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
irom -ki area operator tor irvury re-ulnm- trom
anv inherent risk or sknrj : 7^ J7 o.l
NOTES I'O DECISIONS
Analysis
Assumption oi risk
Bailment
Causation
LVamshops
•Jury instructions
Last clear chance.
Open and obvious danger
1 nit method of determining negligence
Wrongful death
Cited
Assumption of risk.
Assumption ot' risk.' i c . risk of a known
danger voiuntaniv assumed, may amount to a
;ack "i due care con.slituting negligence: where
-uch is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff m an action governed bv
^mparative negligence -tau;te. he is charge-
iio.e with contributor.' negligence and is liable
'"" have hia recovery reduced or denied in accor
dance with its provisions Rigtrup v Straw-
Derry Water Users Assn. 563 P.2d 1J47 •Utah
.9iM overruled on other grounds. Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hdwe Co., 631 P.2d 865
I'uh 19Mi
Assumption ot risk language is not appropn-
flte to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology- hut i- to be
treated, in its. secondary sense, as contributory
negligence, when the issue is nu.-ec] attention
should be focused on whether a reasonablv pru
dent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it. and if so, whether be would have con
ducted himself in the manner in which the per
son seeking to recover acted in light ol all trie
-urroundin^ circumstances, including the ap
preciated risk, then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person Imm whom recov-
er\ is sought, any damage- allowed should be
diminished in proportion to 'he amount of neg
ligence attributable to the person recovering
Jacobsen Constr Co v St rue to-Lite Eng'g,
Inc , 619 P2d 306 'I'tah 19SO,
As used in ? 78-27 .'17. assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v Burton Lumber &
Hdwe Co. 631 P 2d H65 Utah l'JMli
Assumption of risk language is not appropri
ate in an instruction under comparative negli
gence statutes. Stephens •. Henderson, 741
V 2d 952 'I'tah 1987' Mppiving statute in el-
lect prior to 1986i
The assumption of risk doctrine has been ex-
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78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the lury.
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the tuiai amount of dam
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person .seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C, 1953, 7H-27-39, enacted by I.. acted hv Laws 197.i ch J"9 ^ 3 I'-i.iariL' to
1986, ch. 199. - 3. contribution armmg oint tertlea-ors. ,aa] reen-
Repeals and Reenactments. Laws t9S6. acts the above -ecti.m
cb 199. ; ;! repeals former ; 7---J7-39. as en-
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78-27-41. •Joinder of defendants.
Aperson seeking- reoA crv ^r ;s:iv defendant who 1- a party to the litigation,
mav ]oin a,-, partie- aiv. defendant- v\ ho may have cau.-ed or contributed to the
•rijury or damage lor which recovery is sought, ior the purpose oi' having
aetermmed their re.-pective proportions oi fault.
Historv: ('. 195.1. 7K-27-11. enacted by I.. .n'teci m La'A- PC! ch J"9 : 5 relating to
1986. ch. 199, - 5. :-;ent.-"1 con'.r.nmmn ami mm-mr.::-. ami reerv
Repeals and Reenactments. La-*. - Re-ti, act- itie ..new .-ettiuii
ch P*y. ' •'' repeai- mrmer : 7^ J7-41 a.- t-n-
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A.L.R. Prnduct- iiabiiif. -eiler - ngnt to
.ndemnitv tram mar.ai.Kturer 79 -\ 1. R l:h
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
Arelease given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release -o provides.
History: C. 1953. 78-27-42. enacted by L. acted hv Law- PC:1, ch JH9. - ti. relating to
19H6 ch. 199, > H. release ot' aint Mrtfea.-or- and a reduction ot
Repeals and Reenactments. - Law- !98n, claim, ami reenact.- the atxwe section
ch 199. 5 >i repeals jnrmer : 7.--J7-1J a- en-
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Am.Jur. 2d. bti Am .Jur Jd Release - :J5 against one 'oint tortfeasor a- relea-e of ethers.
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bution against eotortteasor. M A L R 3d 137-4 Validity and effect of agreement with one
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negiigent treatment of imurv 39 A L.R 3d JbU ment thereof relative to recovery against non-
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78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem
nity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any com
mon law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to.
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63. Chapter 30, and the exclu
sive remedv provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
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APPENDIX 4
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Company of Utah, et al., 211 U.A.R. 8
(April 22, 1993)
r>;is om.iion :: raj;.::: :a rcMSion b<fort .'Inc.!
pdtUczxon :r. ;tu Pacific Repor.cr.
Kenneth Kay Sullivan,
Plaintiff,
v.
Scoular Grain Company of Utah;
Union Pacific Railroad Company,
a Utah corporation,- Secular
Grain company, The Scoular
company, Robert 0'Block, and
Gordon Olch, dba Freeport
center Associates; Tracknobile,
Inc. , a Georgia corporation,
formerly known as Whiting Corp.;
The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, a
Delaware corporation; Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company,
a Utajh corporation; Utah
Power & Light Company, a
Utah corporation; and G.W.
Van Keppel Company, a
Missouri corporation,
Defendants.
Federal certification
•„• T C '
No. 910432
FILED
April 22, 1993
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Attorneys: M. Douglas Bayly, L. Rich Humpherys, Salt Lake city,
for Sullivan ... . r^,.
Paul M. Belnap, Victoria K. Kidman, Salt Laxe Cx^,
for Trackmobile, Inc. „,,•>. Ca-s+- t,vpD. Gary Christian, Michael F. Skolmck, Saxt Lake
City, for G.W. Van Keppel Company cv^>-
J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for Oregon Shor.
Line Railroad and Union Pacific Railroad
H. James Clegg, Salt Lake City, for Utah Powe.
and Light
On Certification from the United States District
court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
The Honoratle J. Thomas Green*
-?£ T08*xno^s •N'ra": ?*:•£•
->;•-•-••-/ _ 7-.S - 1"S :
— •. •—
This case comes to us pursuant to ru -e 41 c-
Fu^es of Aoceilate Procedure as a question certified :r=~ tr.o
United States District: Court for the District of Ut3h. T-'C
issues nave bean accepted on certification:
1, Under the Utah Comparative Fault
Act,1 Utah Code Annot. § 78-27-33, et. seq.,
can a jury apportion the fault of the
plaintiff's employers that caused or
contributed to the accident although said
employers are immune from suit under Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-60, et. seq.
2. Under the Utah' Comparative Fault
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38, et seq., can
a jury apportion the fault of an individual
or entity that has been dismissed from the
litigation but against whom it is claimed
that they have caused or contributed to the
accident.2
We hold that the purpose and intent of the Utah
Liability Reform Act require that a jury account* for the relative
proportion of fault of a plaintiff's employer that may have
caused or contributed to an accident, even though the employer is
immune from suit. Apportionment of fault does not of itself
subject the employer to civil liability. Rather, the t
apportionment process merely ensures that no defendant is held
liable to any claimant for an amount of damages in excess of the
percentage of fault attributable to that defendant.
We also hold'that an individual or entity dismissed
from a case pursuant to an adjudication on the merits of the
1 These issues are reproduced exactly as certified by the
United States District Court. However, "Utah Comparative Faul_
Act" is not the official name of tne act cited here. In 1936,
the Utah Legislature repealed what was the Comparative *f^gence
Act and enacted the present Liability Reform Act. 1986 Utan La*s
ch. 199-
2^se are issues of first impression in Utah. Defendant
^rackmobile cited three Utah cases in support of the merits of
its ir-otion to apportion fault. We do not address those cases ^
because they were decided before the enactment of the statute a.
issue and are not dispositive of any question now before .he
court.
910432
1iab 11itv issue nay not be included in the a~porticr.-er.~, ~ when
a defendant is dismissed due to a determination of lach of fault
as a matter of law, the defendant's exclusion from acportior.r.er.t
does net subject the regaining defendants to liability for
car-ages in excess of their proportionate fault.
The following facts are taken from the federal district
court's certification order. In October 1986, plaintiff Kenneth
Sullivan lost his left am and left leg in an accident en the
railroad tracks at the Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah. At
the time of his injury, Sullivan was assigned to unload grain
from rail cars into warehouses. He was employed by Scoular Grain
Company, Freeport Center Associates, and Scoular Grain Company of
Utah ("the Scoular parties").
Sullivan filed this action against the Scoular parties,
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, Utah Power
& Light Company, Trackmobile, Inc., and G.W. Van Keppel Company.
In 1989, the federal district court found the Scoular parties-
immune from plaintiff's claim under the exclusive remedy
provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Law and dismissed them
from the action. That court also found that defendant Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railroad had no legal duty to Sullivan and
dismissed it from the lawsuit. The remaining defendants in the
case are Utah Power & Light, Trackmobile, G.W. Van Keppel, Union
Pacific Railroad, and Oregon Short Line Railroad. A motion to
dismiss Utah Power & Light for lack of jurisdiction is pending at
this time.
Defendant Trackmobile moved to have the jury apportion
and compare the fault of all the originally named defendants,
whether dismissed or present at trial. Plaintiff opposed this
motion, claiming that only the fault of parties who are
defendants at trial may be compared.
li IMMUNE EMPLOYERS
A. Statutory Interpretation
The court's principal duty in interpreting statutes is
to determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. "ensen
3 We do not decide whether a jury may apportion the fault of
persons who are not parties in an action for reasons other than
dismissal on the merits. The question may arise when potentially
liable persons are excluded from an action due to, for example,
failure of service of process, settlement, a covenant net to sue,
a plaintiff's failure to join a party, an applicable statute of
limitations, or some other affirmative defense.
No. 51:4
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Plaintiff araues that his former employers must be
excluded from the apoortionment process because they are not
"defendants" under the Liability Reform Act's definition.
Section 63-3-11 of the Utah Code states that "words and phrases
. . . [which] are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition." Under section 73-27-39 of the Liability Reform Act,
a jury may be instructed "to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage'or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery and to each defendant." Section 78-27-37(1)
defines "defendant" as "any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, plaintiff argues,
because the district court found the Scoular parties to be
"immune from suit" under the exclusive remedy provision of Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah code Ann. § 35-1-60, they are not
defendants and are excluded from apportionment under the plain
language of the Act.
Excluding plaintiff's employers from the apportionment
process, however, would directly conflict with the language of
other sections of the Act which require that no defendant be held
liable for damages in excess of its proportion of fault. The
relevant portions of sections 78-27-38 and -40 read as follows:
78-27-38. comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall
not alone bar recovery by that person. He
may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds his own.
However, no defendant is liable to anv person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess _of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant. " .
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited
to proportion of fault—No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant mav be_liable to
anv person seeking recovery Is that
percentage or proportion of the damages ^
eouivalent to the_percentaga or proportion Of.
fault attributed to that, defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person.
4 This is true except in those cases in which an employe:
did not cause or contribute to the employee's injury.
::o. 9104S2
1.7 \n l^'l
femphasis added.) If tne Secular parties, who allegedly
contributed to the accident, -ire not included en the spec 131
verdict form, the rem a in lr.c defendants will be cc ter.t la 1lv liable
to plaintiff for an amount in excess of their orcpcr11cr. cf
fault. For example, if •z.r.s Secular parties were 91% at f^ult and
the defendants remaining in the action were 10% at fault, rhe
remaining defendants would be apportioned 1CC% of any damages
awarded even though they were only 10% at fault.3 Such a result
would violate the plain language of sections 73-27-33 and -40.
Thus, we are faced with two arguably contradictory
statutes within the same article. Section 73-27-37 defines
"defendant" in a way that appears to preclude the inclusion of an
employer from apportionment. But excluding employers from
apportionment would violate the mandate of section 73-27-4 0 that
no defendant be held liable for damages greater than its
proportion of fault. This conflict creates an ambiguity that
requires the court to make a policy inference as to the overall
purpose and intent of the Act.
B. Legislative History
"When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try
to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by
the purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative
history." Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 333, 841 (Utah
1990) (citations omitted). We then try to harmonize ambiguous
provisions accordingly. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 308 P.2d
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).
In the 1936 session of the Utah Legislature, Substitute
Senate Bill No. 64 proposed that a jury may determine the "total
amount of damages sustained and a percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each
defendant, and to each-Other person whose fault contributed to
the injury or damages." (Emphasis added.) Before being enacted,
the bill was amended by deleting the part underlined above and
inserting the word "and", before "to each defendant." The result
is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking"recovery
and to each defendant.
5 The percentages used here are merely for purposes of
illustration and do not refieco any factual determination cf the
actual fault of the parties involved.
_z:z n?E lee^n'rs ^n'Z'j :i:-:: -r.
-ui-;van aroues that this amendment shows that the ^ecis.ature
^-^ rr>- -n^^nd to include ncnoartias m the apportionment
:r:csss.
Trackmobile counters that the reason ror the amendment
s not clear and aroues that, by contrast, the intent ct the
cc-parativa nealigence statute to limit a defendant's liability
to his or her proDorticn of fault is clear. That purpose is to
ensure that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess'of the proportion^of fault
attributable to that defendant." Utah Code Ann- § /8-27-33.
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Reeves v. Gent lie.,
313 P.2d ill, 115 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted), Jhus, failing
to include immune employers in the apportionment violates the
main purpose of the Act by improperly subjecting the remaining
defendants to liability in excess of their proportion of fauiu.
other portions of the Act's history support this
conclusion. First, during a floor debate prior to the adoption
of the bill, one senator observed that "it is the basic fairness
concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on the hoo*
only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the
guarantor for everyone else's damages." Floor Debate, Utah
Senate, 46th Leg. 1986, General Sess., Senate Day 31, Records
No 63 (Feb. 12, 1986). Second, each preliminary draft of- Senate
Bill 64 states in the title that the purpose of the Act was,
among other things, "abolishing joint and several liabili-y. I
the jury is prevented in this case from considering the relative
fault of the Scoular parties in the apportionment process,
Trackmobile and the other defendants will be held liable in the
event of a verdict for plaintiff, not only for their own
proportionate share of fault, but also for the proportionate
share of fault attributable to the Scoular parties. Thus, one of
the major evils of joint and several liability would result, ana
the stated purpose of the legislature in abolishing it would be
frustrated.
This interpretation of the Liability Reform Act is in
harmony with the Workers' compensation Act; "when a construction
of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another ac,
we have a duty to "construe the acts to be in harmony and to_^
avoid conflicts." .Ti»r* y. Salt Lake County., .822 P.2d 770, 7/3
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted). The Workers' Compensation Ac.
provides an injured employee's "exclusive remedy" against an
employer in place of any other "civil liability" and provides
that no "action at law" may be maintained against an employer
based on any injury to an employee. Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-60.
Tn our view, this exclusive remedy does nor bar the Scoular
ok^-t'es from the apportionment process because apportionment is
not an action at law and would not impose any civil liability on
No. 5 104 3 2 6
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encerns about procedural problems win.-.
a^„_ri-0.-er arQ nCh oersuasive. We believe that emp-cyars are
-^"^^udiced bv being included in the apportionment process rcr
t^e'a"4asons. First, employers have a financial interest .n .ne
cu«-C(-.me of tne action. The Workers' Compensation Act provides,
"The person liable for condensation payments shall be reimbursed
in^uli'fcr all payments sade [by the third-parry defendant to
the'iniured employee] less the proportionate share of cos.s and
attorneys' fees . . . ." Id^ S 35-1-62(2).
Second, the Workers' Compensation Act expressly
provides employers (or their insurance carriers) notice and a
reasonable opportunity to appear in the action. ,he b.an
Workers' Compensation Act provides:
Before proceeding against the third party,
the injured employee, or, in case of death,
his heirs, shall give written notice of sucn
intention to the carrier or other person _
obligated for the compensation payments, in
order to give such person a reasonable
opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62.
Third, the Utah Liability Reform Act also provides for
a jury to apportion the fault of "personal seeking recovery.
Id. $78-27-39. The Act defines "person seeking recovery"as
^ypiraon seeking damages or reimbursement on ^0*V^ lecal
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative." I<L_ S 78-27-37(3). Thus, due ,o the
reimbursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Ac.
employers (or their insurance carriers) may be legitimately
viewed as persons seeking recovery under the Act,
Therefore, employers have a financial interest in the
apportionment process. Because the legislature *£*«?"«£ .
provided (1) that employers be given notice and an opportunity .
and 2, that thejury may apportion the fault of persons
seeking recovery, we believe that it is not procedurally un,ai^
for a jury to apportion the fault of nonparty^employers.
C. Other Jurisdictions
Other states have dealt with the issue of how to
apportion fault in workers' compensation third-party actios m .
va^etv of ways. See Appendix for examples. Although -ese
de^sions involve somewhat different statutes, their jreason.-.g
ma"be helpful. For example, the California Court or -ppea.
S o . ? 1 - - 3
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recently ruled m a case substantially similar to the case at
bar. M'l's v. MyM Carpets Ino ., 1 Cal. ?.ptr. 2d 811 -Ct. App.
I?91) .^r"eviev dis_mi ssed ,~10 Cal. P.ptr. 2d 625 (1992). In >.lll5,
a za^k employee sued various parties for damages because she was
in.-ured when the heel of her shoe punctured a section of
carmeting that had been laid over an uncovered utility hole. The
employer's insurer intervened, seeking indemnity for workers'
cornuensation benefits it had paid to the plaintiff on behalf cf
the'employer. The defendants claimed that under California's
Fair Responsibility Act, the contributive fault of the employer
should be considered in determining the proportionate share of
each defendant's liability for noneconomic damages. California's
Fair Responsibility Act provides in relevant part:
In any action for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death, based upon
principles of comparative fault, the
liability of each defendant for non-economic
damages shall be several only and shall not
be joint. Each defendant shall be liable
only for the amount of non-economic damages
allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to that defendant's percentage of
fault, and a separate judgment shall be
rendered against that defendant for that
amount.
Cal. Civ. Code S 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
The court, noting that the purpose of the Act was to abolish the
inequity and injustice of joint and several liability, decided
that excluding the plaintiff's employer from apportionment would
"result [in] a form of joint liability which the statute is meant
to avoid" and held that "the apportionment of liability . . .
must take into account the fault of all tortfeasors, whether or
not they are named as defendants, [or] subject to liability for
damages." 1 Cal. Rptr. at 814, 817. The court-conceded that
employers are "generally immune from tort -liability" under
California's workers' compensation J.aw and noted in addition that
the Fair Responsibility Act' "is not intended, in any way, to
alter the law of immunity." XA±. at 818. Nevertheless, creating
a rule which it found consistent with both acts, the court
explained that "the negligent employer's fault in a case like
this one is measured, not in order to impose tort liability on
it, but to determine the comparative fault and commensurate
liability of a defendant in the action." Xd^-
We have applied similar reasoning in holding that
Utah's Liability Reform Act requires a jury to apportion the
fault of a plaintiff's employer even though the employer is
immune from suit under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.
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Judicial or leoislative decision ccr.es:
liaci^itv recu ires a .-a _a..~ _.••-« c.. ^...^.e-*..^ -.. v&±_ ^_
oc-iC' oecisicn as l_c «h ^c.
'•—un- cr insolvent tort-feascr. Prior to 1336, uncer ::;,.: anc
sever*' liability, a tort-feascr bore the risk of paying net en-/
his or her snare'of the plaintiff's damages, but also the shares
c* other tort-feasors who were impecunious or immune from suit.
The 1986 Utah Liability Reform Act shifted the risks caused by
impecunious or immune tort-feasors to the plaintiffs by
abolishing joint and several liability and contribution among
tort-feasors.
Plaintiff correctly asserts that if his employer's
actions are included in apportionment, his recovery may be
significantly reduced. Plaintiff's recovery from nonetapxoyer
defendants would be reduced directly in proportion to the
percentage of fault, if any, the jury attributes to the employer.
On the other hand, in Trackmobile's view, fairness to
the defendants requires that each defendant pay only ;ts
proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages Ift.e Sccu ar
parties are not included in apportionment, Trackmobile ana .He
other defendants would be liable for damages in excess of their
proportion of fault. "There is nothing inherently fair about adefendant who isf, for example,] 10% at fault pay^ "0, of the
loss ...... Brown v. Keill, 530 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978).
General comparative negligence theory also supports the
inclusion of nonparty employers in apportionment. For example,
according to Heft and Heft:
It is accepted practice to include all
tortfeasors in the apportionment question.
This includes nonparties who may be unknown
tortfeasors, phantom drivers, and persons
alleged to be negligent but not liable in
damages to the injured party such as in the
third party cases arising in the workmen s
compensation area.
-"• ^-" oartv should bear the r is/.s
The reason for such rules is that true
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty
of causal negligence either causing or ^
contributing'to the occurrence in question,
whether or not they are parties to the case.
C—or r Heft & C James Heft, Cc^r^<v V-qUcer.ee Manual,
§"TiOc\ at 14 (John J. Palmer i Stephen M. Flanagan tas., rev.
_ _, -t - —
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ed . 199 2, :footnote omitted) . Thus , it is accepted pract: c : f z
"ha -ur/ to aoocrtion the comparative fault of all tori~-~?.3ur^
wnen ccmcara11ve nea 11cenc9 is at issue.3
Plaintiff aisc crotacts tne detrimental errect en r.is
reoc.'erv created bv tne employer reimbursement provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act. Sect ion 25-1-6 2 provides for an
employer or insurer to obtain reimbursement for any payments made
to an injured employee. This lien is net reduced in any respecm
by the amount by which the employer's act or omission contributed
to the employee's injuries. Thus, any judgment Sullivan wins
against a party defendant will be reduced up to the amount the
insurer in this case paid to Sullivan in workers' compensation
benefits.
Consequently, when a verdict is granted to the
plaintiff in an amount equal to or greater than the employer's
workers' compensation payments, the Act allows an at-fault
employer to escape liability altogether at the expense of the
injured employee.7 We agree with plaintiff that this result is
inequitable, but the effect of the statutory language is clear.
However, "[w]here statutory language is plain and
unambiguous," we will "not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 635, 686
(Utah 1989). The language of section 35-1-62(2) is unambiguous
on this point: "The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made [by a third
party to an injured employee] less the proportionate share of
costs and attorney's fees provided for in Subsection (1)." Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-62(2) (emphasis added) . We are not free "to
6 A solid majority of states in the Pacific region have
adopted the practice of apportioning the fault of nonparties i:
negligence actions. These states have done so either expressly
by statute or by judicial interpretation. •In addition, several
states allow consideration of nonparty negligence while retaining
joint and several liability. See Appendix for a sampling of
cases.
7 The Kansas Supreme court recognized the inequity in
allowing a partially negligent employer to recover full
subrogation in Neglev v. ttassev Ferguson., _Inc_^_, 625 P.2d 472, 475
(Kan. 1981), but refused to reduce the employer's lien because
"[t]he extent and nature of the subrogation rights of an employer
under the workmen's compensation statutes are matters for
legislative determination." Id^ at 476. To remedy this
inequity, the Kansas'Legislature amended its workers'
compensation law to provide that the employer's subrogation
interest "shall be diminished by the percentage of the damage
award attributed td the negligence of the employer." Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 44-504(d) (£upp. 1990).
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assess the wisdom of a statutory scheme." West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P-2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)- Moreover, no Challenge
to the validity of the reimbursement provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act is before this court at this time. Thus,
plaintiff's remedy on this point is a legislative me.
II. DISMISSED NCNEMPLOYER DEFENDANTS
The remaining noneaployer defendants in the case are
Utah Power & Light, Trackaobile, G.W, Van Keppel, Union Pacific
Railroad, and Oregon Short Line Railroad. As noted above, the
district court found that Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
("D&RG") had no legal duty to Sullivan and dismissed it from the
lawsuit.
Trackmobile urges that all named defendants, including
those dismissed from the proceeding, be included in
apportionment. However, plaintiff argues that because the trial
court dismissed D&RG, it is not a defendant and the jury may not
consider its actions or omissions in the apportionment process.
Plaintiff again relies heavily on the definitions of the
Liability Reform Act for support. The relevant definitions of
the Act provide:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not
immune from suit who is claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach
of legal duty, act, or omission proximately
causing or contributing to injury or damages
Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-37(1), (2) (1986) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff asserts that the requirement that "fault" be^
"actionable" precludes the inclusion of D&RG in apportionment.
Plaintiff urges a definition of "actionable" fault that
is too restrictive. An act or omission may be actionable even if
tne plaintiff cannot, as a practical matter, secure a judgment
against a defendant. Black's defines "actionable" as n[t]hat for
which an action will lie, furnishing legal ground for an action."
Black's Law Dictionary 29 (6th ed. 1990). A plaintiff may have
legal grounds for a cause of action against a-defendant, and the
defendant may be dismissed due to, for example, tne assertion of
a successful affirmative defense. Thus, the Act's definition of
"fault" does not necessarily preclude the apportionment of fault
of nonparties.
Nevertheless, we hold that D&RG, which was dismissed
pursuant to an adjudication on the merits, may not be included m
apportionment. D&RG was dismissed due to a lack of fault as a
* i No. 9:c 4 z z
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matter of law. Thus, D&RG's exclusion will not subject rem.air.in:
defendants to potential liability for damages in excess of t.-.eir
proportionate fault.
Trackmcbiie has also raised an equal protection
argument under the state and federal constitutions. Because we
have interpreted the statutes at issue to require that the jury
appor-ion the fault of employers of plaintiffs in third-party
workers' compensation litigation, this issue need not be reached
Based on the foregoing analysis, our answers to the
questions certified from the federal court are as follows:
1. A jury may apportion the fault of
employers under Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-38 to
-43 notwithstanding their immunity under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
2. A jury may not apportion the fault
of a party that has been dismissed from the
lawsuit pursuant to an adjudication on the
merits of the liability issue.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Appendix
Apportionment of Nonparty Fault in Negligence Actions
in States Reported in the pacific Reporter
States that have expressly adopted tfais practice by
statute include Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 12-2506.B
(1991), Diets v. General Elec. ._C_oJ_, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (Ariz.
1991) (including immune employers); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-21-111.5(3) (a) (1987), Williams v. White Mountain Constr.
Co. , 749 P.2d 423, 429 (Colo. 1983) (same); Kansas, Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 44-504(d) (1986 & Supp. 1991), Srabander y.._Western Cooo
Elec. , 811 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Kan. 19B6) (same); New Mexico, N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 41-3A-1.3 (1989), Tavlor v. Delgarno Transn., Inc.
No. 910482 12
ei'd uiT6 -96 108-in'jns "si^'cro ••
««- ? 2d 445, 443 (N.M. 1532', (same;, overruled on other zz^_^,
;;„.;3 ., ^<al sec. Inc., 333 ?. 2d 971 (N.M. 1992); ffasnmg.-n,
wtih. Rev. Code Ann. S 4.22.C7C(1) (1956), C.ar-K v. r*ci-ic^,
322 ?.2d 162, 165 (Wash. 1591) (same).
;n other states, courts have interpreted general
comparative negligence statutes to require apportionment of
nonparty fault. California, Cal. Civ. Code § *431.2(a ( ^
Supo. 1993), v^^ v *xm carpets. Inc., 1 Cai. Rptr. 2d 813, _3.4(c" Apo 1991) (including immune employers), review dismissea,
10 cal." Rptr. 2d 635 (1992); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat,
s 663-31fbH2> (••«"«" ^aniola v. CavdrP.v Mars Joint Venture,?0? P.2SC365, 373 (Haw. 1985) (same); Idaho, "^^ode ««-8021990), Pnrai-.no Indus. ^rV y, st..l ^"g-^6^^^9' 4°3i n.4 (Idaho 1980), £3 ranger v. State, 727 P. 2d 1222, _2^4
rtdaho 1«86) (same); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, 131987? n^i v. CAkTK ^^ Co.. 719 P.2d 824, 826-27 (Okla.[Ill) (saw); Wyoming, Hyo. Stat, s 1-1-109 (1991), Burton vi?!gL(r^;;iaYCo..723P>2d 1214, 1221 (Wyo. 1986) (including
settling tort-feasors).
The following states retain joint and several liability
but allow the consideration of nonparty negligence for the
limited purpose of determining whether all or none °f «Je *°*alfault can b2 attributed to the nonparty. v£"tol *laB£7S*a*a
« 09 17 080 (1991), T^e v- Construction Mach. , Xnc^., 787 P.2d07 1031 Alaska 1990) (including immune employers);
Montana Mont. Code Ann. S 27-1-703(4) (1991) (expressly
excluding immune employers) .
In contrast, only two states flatly refuse to allow a
605 (Or. 1987).
STEWART r Justic* (n|ssentindL:
The majority opinion holds that an immune non-defendant
direct defiance of the specific language ?£_*&* *fVd«ttart oflegislative history, eo^littly rr«rw tht anUnded effac. of£hl Act as to how fault ^ould.be apport^ned when one of the
parties whose negligence contributed to the plamtitr s xnj
is immune from liability.
in 1973, the Utah Legislature adopted the Comparative
«.,iig.„c.1^! which abolished -t^butory-^|—Q ^n,
absolute bar to an action out ief^ mtac une ao
?:"d -i:6 t^ge loe'in-^s •h'S':"
ard several liability. 1973 Ut^h Laws ch. 209. The Liability
Ro*c>-- k-Z/ adopted in 1386, carried forward several provisions
*r.Z-~-ne c^r.oarative Neaiicer.ce Act: but dispensed with joint ar.o
s^ve-ai liability. 1935 Utah Laws ch. 199. Under the Act, fault
is -o be aocortior.ed to each party, with eacn party bearing
liability for its apoortioned fault. No party is Uaaie for
fault apportioned to'another party. Utah code Ann. § 73-27-40.
The central issue in this lawsuit is how the
Legislature intended to apportion the fault of a person immune
fom liability (a non-party) who is one of multiple tort-feasors
causing a plaintiff's injuries. The Legislature specifically
addressed and resolved that issue. The Act expressly provides
that fault shall not be allocated to a pa^ty immune from
liability. Section 78-27-39 states:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party, shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, fault is to be attributed onJLY to "each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.» The Act then
defines the word "defendant" to specifically exclude persons who
are immune from liability. Section 78-27-37 states:
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through
78-27*43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person
not immune from suit who is claimed to
be liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery.
(Emphasis added.) This section makes clear that tfte term
defendant does not jpnlnrift negligent persons vfro are immune £rom
liability- In short, the Legislature contemplated the issue a.
hand and expressly provided that fault is to be allocated only
among non-immune parties to a lawsuit, even though an _immune
person may be partly responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
Two other sections in the Act not only reinforce,_but
compel the same conclusion. Section 78-27-41 states that either
a plaintiff or a defendant who is a party to the lxtigation
;nay join as parties any defendants who may
have caused or contributed to the injury or
damages for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault.
Nc- 910432 I4
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-scuires sceciai verdicts, when requested, for determinint
"^a"'"- af-i'outed to "each oerson seeking recovery ana to -
defendant." 3oth the ^cinder and special verdict provisions ar-
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the
The purpose of joinder is to determine the non-immune
defendants- "respective proportions of fault." S 78-27-41. The
"fault" to be allocated is defined by § 78-27-37(2) as any _
n.,^nahi, hrP.ach of legal duty . . . causing or contributing „oinfu^fofdamages /\ TT^^hasis added.) Because an immune
party's negligence is not. an "actionable breach of legal duty,
that negligence cannot be apportioned. In short, an "*}£*
oartv such as plaintiff's employer in this action, has not
engaged in an "actionable breach of legal duty" and simply is not
subject to the special verdict apportionment procedure under the
statute.
The Legislature could not have been more explicit and
consistent in providing exactly how and to whom fault should be
allocated. Indeed, the Legislature expressly re-jected the
position the majority adopts. Senate Bill 64, which became the
Act in issue, initially provided:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separata jury verdicts determining the
total amount of damage sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to earth other person
whose fault contributed to the miury or
damage*.
(Emphasis added.) Th. Senate committee reportjfaows that th^
italicized phrase was purposefully deleted. Uta( that phrase
would have done exactly what the majority foes today, .he
majority nevertheless dismisses this compelling piece of
legislative history on the transparent ground^that it is not
clear why the language was deleted.
The Legislature consciously adopted a policy that
excluded the negligence of non-immune persons from the fault
apportionment process. Asserting that it would be unfair .o^ake
demandants bear the fault of an immune party, the majority s^?-.
s^tsaside the judgment of the Legislature as expressea m the
explicit statutory language and imposes its own poi.c/.
15
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What the
No. 9 1043 2
maioritv fails to recognise is that the policy adopted by the
Legislature divides tne fault of an immune party among onth^
olaintiffs and defendants. The policy adopted by the majority,
on the"cther hand, loads that fault entirely onto a plaintiff.
The legislative policy is neither irrational nor
inevitable. Practically speaking, a jury would naturally be
^n-i^r.ed to allocate the fault of an immune person among both
plaintiffs and defendants. If a plaintiff is 20% at fault, each
of two named defendants is 30% at fault, and an immune person_is
20% at fault, the Legislature could reasonably assume that a jury
would allocate the immune person's 20% fault among the plaintiff
and the defendants, probably according to their respective
percentages of "actionable fault." Thus, there is no reason to
assume, as the majority does, that the immune person's fault will
be attributed solely to defendants under Utah's comparative
negligence scheme.
The majority position will necessarily result in the
entire amount of an immune person's fault being deducted from a
plaintiff's damages. The blatant inequity of that position is
especially acute when an immune employer's insurance company
claims all or part of a plaintiff's recovery by way of
subrogation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The majority rejects clear and consistent statutory
language and its compelling legislative history with the
extraordinary argument that "failing to include immune employers
in the apportionment violates the main purpose of the Act by_
improperly subjecting the remaining defendants to liability m
excess of their proportion of fault." I see nothing improper m
the legislative scheme. The fact is that it is for the
Legislature—not this Court—to decide how to deal with the faul.
of an immune party in a multi-defendant comparative negligence
case.
While it is true that the Act abolishes joint and
several liability, that was not its sole purpose. The Act also
provides the manner in which fault should be allocated in
comparative negligence cases and how the universe of actionable
fault should be apportioned when one oarty is immune. As noted,
even a plaintiff may be held responsible for a paxt of an immune
person's negligence under the provisions of the Act. Defining
the universe of fault, as the Legislature has done, is not, at
bottom, an issue of joint and several liability. Rather, the
process turns on the concepts underlying proximate cause.
The existence of fault has always depended upon whether
the negligence of a party had a substantial causative connection
to a plaintiff's injuries. Because the law requires only a
substantial causative connection, a defendant or defendants may
be held legally responsible for causing an injury, even though
there are some actual causes for which the defendant or
Mo. 910482 16
defendants are not responsible. Hut if a defendant's negligence
is not a substantial cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then no
liability may attach to that defendant. For this reason,
proximate cause is defined in terms of substantial causative
factors- That point is critical in the policy the Legislature
adopted. If an immune person's negligence is great enough, a
jury would be obliged to find that the named non-immune
defendants did not proximately cause the injury, even if they
were negligent, and thus deny the plaintiff any recovery. But if
the immune person's negligence is not that great, a jury will
have to determine the relative proportion of actionable fault
attributable to the plaintiffs and the named defendants. In this
process, the universe of fault to which the plaintiff and the
defendants contributed is the universe of actionable fault.
The damage the majority does to the legislative scheme
and to a plaintiff's rights•is exacerbated by the provision in
the Workers' Compensation Act that gives an employer (whose fault
may have contributed to a plaintiff's injuries) a lien against
the plaintiff's damage recovery for benefits paid out of workers'
compensation. Thus, not only is the plaintiff made responsible
for the employer's proportionate share of fault, but he must
also reimburse his employer out of his diminished recovery for
any workers'" compensation benefits received. This is not only
unjust and inequitable, but might well be unconstitutional.
herein.
31 *d
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, does not participate
17 N'O. 9104
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APPENDIX 5
Affidavit of Representative Jack F. DeMann
House Sponsor of S.B. 64
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF FORMER
REPRESENTATIVE,
JACK DEMANN REGARDING
S.B. 64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a THE
LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF
1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Jack DeMann, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
the following to be true to his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature, I
was a duly elected Representative serving in the House of
Representatives.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session. I served as
that Act's House Sponsor.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
4. I have reviewed the affidavits dated the 19th day
of May 1993 of Senator Haven J. Barlow and former Senator
Paul Rogers concerning the intent of the 1986 Legislature
in passing the Act. From my personal knowledge I concur
that my intent and that of the House of Representatives at
the time of passage of S.B. 64 was as stated in those
affidavits.
5. To the best of my knowledge, no representative
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein nor different than that
2 -
stated by Senator Barlow and former Senator Paul Rogers in
their affidavits.
Jack DeMann
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Former Representative Jack DeMann, the signer of
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
Residing at:_
- 3 -
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APPENDIX 6
Excerpt of taped floor debates
Utah House of Representatives
February 26, 1986
General Session
EXCERPT OF TAPED FLOOR DEBATES
UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 26, 1986-GENERAL SESSION
Custodiani This is a recording of the floor debates in the
Utah House of Representatives for substitute
Senate Bill 64 of 1986 General Session. This is
taken from the records of the 46th Legislature
House of Representatives, day 45, February 26,
1986 records 18 and 19.
House Clerk; Substitute senate Bill No, 64, Liability Reform
Act, by Haven J. Barlow, Jack M. Bangerter, C.E. Petersen, Paul
Rogers, Warren Pugh, Glade M. Sowarda, Eldon A. Money, Donna M.
Wayment, Brent C. Overson, John C. Holmgren and Wayne L.
Sandberg. Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah.
Speakeri Repreaentative DeMann.
Representative Jack Demann: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Ladies and
gentleman, our majority leader Glen Brown waa going to handle
this bill but is tied up over in conference but felt it was
important enough that he did not want it circled and asked if we
would please proceed and asked me to carry it for him. I am
pleased to do that.
Ladies and gentlemen what this bill does is to assure that
no defendant shall be liable for more than hia share of
plaintiffs' damages in suit. We have before you tonight a
substitute bill. The reason we have a substitute bill is because
originally SB 64 attempted to change more of the tort laws than
just joint and severable1. Through seven hours, I would like to
emphasize that please, through seven hours of Senate Committee
hearings the proponents of the bill made several accommodations
to the plaintiffs' bar. Those appear on page 3 of the sheet
'ale. Representative DeMann's use of the term severable is
obviously meant to be several,
which you have received at your desk and which I have here in my
hands for your reference.
Prior to the substitute bill, Mr. Roger Sandack and Mr.
Brent Wilcox made the following written statement: "The solution
is to provide for comparing the plaintiff's fault againBt the
defendants' collective fault. Then, once liability is
established the remaining provisions of this bill would restrict
the plaintiff to recovering from each defendant only its
proportionate share of the judgment, thus attaining the fairness
that this bill is after." Now substitute 64 engenders the
concept that Mr. Sandack and Mr. Wilcox so eloquently stated. The
point that I am making or trying to make at this time is that
concessions have baen mada, the issue is joint and severable and
should we keep it on the books or not.
The issues have been debated, the concessions have been made
and I would like to quickly point out to you, if you will refer
back to this fact sheet please, that there have in recent years
been 14 other states who have either abolished or limited the
joint and severable liability in their law. On the second page
you will find at the top of that sheet an indication of the
growing impact that this has on the State of Utah, the State
government/ and local governments. Would you also be aware that
it has the same impact on the so called deep poaket private
entities, larger and smaller businesses.
Those who support the bill are listed on the bottom of page
2 and I think that you will see that that represents 29 groups.
If you will turn to page 3, it addresses why there is a
substitute bill and I leave you that information. Finally, I
would like to indicate to you that I think we have before us a
matter of fairness. What is fair in assessing liability and I
submit to you that the practice which we have had in the past
which leaves a defendant who has been adjudged only to have a
very small percentage of the liability, holding in fact all of
the financial liability or a major share of it. With that much
introduction, Mr. Speaker I would be very happy to entertain
questions and of course welcome comments.
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APPENDIX 7
Affidavit of Senator Haven J. Barlow
Principal Sponsor of S.B. 64
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Dennis V. Lloyd #1984
Attorney at Law
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*************
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a UTAH CORPORATION;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK, and GORDON OLCH,
dba FREEPORT CENTER
ASSOCIATES; TRACKMOBILE,
INC., a GEORGIA CORPORATION,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS WHITING
CORP.; THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, A SHORT LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY, a DELAWARE
CORPORATION; OREGON SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
UTAH CORPORATION; UTAH POWER
& LIGHT COMPANY, A UTAH
CORPORATION; and G.W. VAN
KEPPEL COMPANY, a MISSOURI
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
HAVEN J. BARLOW, SPONSOR OF
S.B. 64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a LIABILITY
REFORM ACT OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*************
Senator Haven J. Barlow, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states the following to be true to his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I was and
I am currently a duly elected Senator serving in the Senate of the
State of Utah.
2. I was principal sponsor of Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter
S.B. 64"), a proposed Liability Reform Act. After my bill's
initial version was drafted and circulated among legislators and
interested parties, I became aware that the State Insurance Fund
(now known as the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, hereinafter
"WCF") and others had serious concerns about the affect the
proposed legislation would have on the Workers' Compensation Act of
Utah (Sections 35-1-1 et seq. U.C.A.). We did not want to disturb
in any manner the present procedures and operation of the WCF or
Utah's workers' compensation system.
3. The concern with the original versions of S.B. 64 as
expressed to me by those parties was that the language might
disturb or could alter the procedures of the workers' compensation
system in several ways.
4. After my study of the situation, I became convinced that
S.B. 64 should be amended to avoid any potential that it would
increase the cost of or alter the workers' compensation system as
it had existed theretofore.
5. Therefore, after further discussions with interested
parties and other legislators, S.B. 64 was amended to address those
concerns. As part of those changes, the term "defendant" was then
2
limited by definition to "...those not immune from suit." (Section
78-27-37 U.C.A.).
6. To leave no doubt of the relationship of the Liability
Reform Act of 1986 to the Workers Compensation Act, S.B. 64
included as proposed Section 78-27-43 U.C.A. the language that
nothing in the Act was to "...affect or impair...the exclusive
remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1."
7. S.B. 64 was then passed into law with little floor debate.
8. The 1986 Legislature intended to do away with joint and
several liability that had previously been the law in Utah. The
Legislature perceived joint and several liability to be an unfair
spreading of the responsibility for negligently caused injuries.
9. It is my opinion that the Legislature intended that
employers be excluded from any fault comparison so as not to alter
the Workers' Compensation Act because their responsibility for
their injured employees was already provided for in the Act. The
Legislature did not want to do anything that would affect the
balance between injured workers' and employers' rights as contained
in the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah. Specifically, the
Legislature did not want to affect the "exclusive remedy"
protection of Section 35-1-60 U.C.A., the cost to employers of
providing no fault workers' compensation benefits for their
employees, or the subrogation right of Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.
10. At this time, I have no recollection of any floor debate
or discussions among legislators which would demonstrate any
legislative intent regarding S.B. 64 contrary to that which I have
stated in this affidavit.
Dated this 19th day of May, 1993.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the A<fday of May, 19g3/ personaUy appeared ^^^ ^
Senator Haven Barlow, the signer of the above instrument, and duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
81444-1
NOTARvTuSUcT""!
DENNIS I LLOYD !
1321 Retucc* Circle J
Salt Lake Ciiy.utan Mil? |
My Commission Exoires 7/20/flBl
STATE OF UTAH
)
: ss.
y./. ^- / g-<Ls>„ C
SENATORiHAVEN/jT1 BARLOW
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
^—-
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APPENDIX 8
Affidavit of former Senator Paul Rogers
Cosponsor of S.B. 64
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 53 0-7 300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O*BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF FORMER
SENATOR Paul Rogers, A
SPONSOR OF S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
intent of the Legislature for the injured employee to bear
the burden of the employer's conduct alone by having the
third-party damages reduced by the employer's proportionate
"fault" and then requiring the injured worker to reimburse
the employer the full amount of the subrogation allowed by
Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. of the Workers Compensation Act of
Utah. Rather, the amendments which became a part of the Act
were designed to make it clear that the employer's conduct
was not to be compared to that of the injured employee and
the defendant(s) in a civil lawsuit. The employer's
responsibility for all their injured employees was provided
for by their participation in the no-fault workers
compensation system.
6. To the best of my knowledge, no legislator
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein nor different than that
stated by Senator Barlow in his affidavit.
Former Senator Paul Rogers
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Paul Rogers, the signer of the above
- 3 -
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
814&4-1
I «
NOTARY PUBLIC
DENNIS I LLOYD
1321 Rebecca Circle
Salt Lake Gty.trtift 84117//J fcty CommoiiM Expire* 7/20/95
STATE OF UTAH
Ol --V L-- V L_ <_- _Q (_
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
- 4 -
- - c- • 1 , --
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APPENDIX 9
Affidavits of:
Senator Arnold Christensen, Current President of the Senat.
Senator Stephan J. Rees
Senator Eldon A. Money
Senator Blaze D. Wharton
Representative James Yardley
Senator John p. Holmgren
Representative Brent H. Goodfellow
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
ARNOLD CHRISTENSEN,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Arnold Christensen, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and currently am a duly elected Senator serving in the
Utah State Legislature and functioning in the office of
Senate President.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers* compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
4. Specifically the Legislature did not intend to do
anything that would in any way affect or call in question
the "Exclusive Remedy Protection" afforded employers by UCA
Section 35-1-60, or add to the cost borne by employers of
providing no-fault workers' compensation benefits to their
employees.
5. To the best of my knowledge, no legislator
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
: ss.
- 2 -
^ /Zz^Z^ > t ,
Senator Arnold Christensen
I
I
L
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Arnold Christensen the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
/
•' /
-2. '*U
814*4-1
B:\REPRESENT.AFF
- 3 -
, /
A
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ///a ^jU_jffU-<-
MOORE J
#310 |
-.84111 :
Expires J
I
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
STEPHEN J. REES,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
* * * * *
Senator Stephen J. Rees, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature. In 1986 I served in the House of
Representatives. Today I am a member of the Senate.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session. .r /u .ff) -^Vj'^'""
3. in passing the Act, the Legislature^did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
'fsU&.
Senator Stephen J. Rees
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Stephen J. Rees the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
7-ac-ng
"TdnTARV PUBLIC I
DENNIS \t LLOYD
1321 RebeccaCtrcie !
5ati Lake City. Waft 84117 1
My Commission Expiree 7/20•951
I
STATE OF UTAH
r^ i--i- v-•-t^) l~' '-^FArrHtcA
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: •L-C- , K.\-\~.
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DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
ELDON A. MONEY
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Eldon A. Money, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers* compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
/ „ >
Senator Eldon A. Money
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Eldon A. Money, the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
1 -zi<^-1 ^
I -
NOTARY PUBLIC"""~1
OENNIS V. LLOYD J
'•22) Rebecca Circtt
Salt LakeCity.Uta*14117
Uy Commiialai Saaam 7/20/Kj
8TATI OF UTAH
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ^lc , u
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GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
BLAZE D. WHARTON,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
******
Senator Blaze D. Wharton, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature. In 1986 I served in the House of
Representatives. Today I am a member of the Senate.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers* compensation system in any way
whatsoever. ,-^~ZZ?/^~ / /i /1
<f
Senator/fi'laze D. Wharton
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Blaze D. Wharton the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
r.-.qy PUBLIC™""!
jnIS V.LLOYD
321 Rebecca Circle
, .„. ^- ,, San Lake City. Utah 14117J \£\>j:k v/ My Cnmiieew Ciftee 7/20/9S
I ff-'ZZ\ 8TATt OF UTAH
CL^-
;U .W-^J. -u =n j£_
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
- 2 -
<~<z. , i |
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GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES
YARDLEY REGARDING S.B.
64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a THE
LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF
1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
******
Representative James Yardley, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was a duly elected Representative serving in the House of
Representatives of the State of Utah. I have continued
serving in that capacity to this day.
2. I recall clearly Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B.
64"), the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the
"Act").
3. I am familiar with the final version of S.B. 64
which eventually came to the floor of the House of
Representatives for passage.
4. I have reviewed the affidavits dated the 19th day
of May 1993 of Senator Haven J. Barlow and former Senator
Paul Rogers concerning the intent of the 1986 Legislature
(hereinafter the "Legislature") in passing the Act. From my
personal knowledge I concur that my intent and that of the
House of Representatives at the time of passage of S.B. 64
was as stated in those affidavits.
5. The intent of the Legislature was that the workers
compensation system was not to be affected in any way
whatsoever.
6. To the best of my knowledge, no representative
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein or different than that
- 2 -
stated by Senator Barlow and former Senator Paul Rogers in
their affidavits.
Representative/James Yardley
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Representative James Yardley, the signer of the
above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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duly sworn, deposes and states the following to be true to
his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me S^ ^^,-hr* *- ~J^U^ P H ,-J ... ^r~r- ^ , the signer of
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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, being first
duly sworn, deposes and states the following to be true to
his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers* compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
C3/u*jt7J.
: ss.
)
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
• ,—
before me Q~ r——•r*-.-. 4-., .,• K^j- \-\ ! ,the signer of
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
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APPENDIX 10
Affidavit of Dennis V. Lloyd
From Brown v. Bowman & Kemp Steel and Supply Company, Inc. et al
Utah Supreme Court No. 910082
JamesR.Black,#0357
WendyB.Moseley,#4096
BLACK&MOORE
261EastBroadway,Suite300
SaltLakeCity,UT84111
Telephone:(801)363-2727
INTHETHIRDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURT
INANDFORSALTLAKECOUNTY,STATEOFUTAH
DANIELC.BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOYER-WASHINGTONBOULEVARD
ASSOCIATES,aUtahlimited
partnership,BOWMAN&KEMP
STEELANDSUPPLYCOMPANY,INC.,
aUtahcorporation;and-.
JACOBSBN-ROBBINSCONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,aUtahcorporation,.^
Defendants.
AFFIDAVITOF
DENNISV.LLOYD
CivilNo.C88-4665
JACOBSEN-ROBBINSCONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,aUtahcorporation,
Third-PartyPlaintiff,
vs.
CCC&T.,aUtahcorporation,
andBOMANfiKEMPSTEELAND
SUPPLY,INC.,aUtah
corporation,
Third-PartyDefendant.
JudgeRichardH.Moffat
DennisV.Lloyd,beingfirstdulysworn,deposesandstates
thefollowingtobetruetohispersonalknowledge:
UCH86
1- I am currently general counsel for the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah (WCFU) and I was manager of the legal
section of WCFU, then known as the State Insurance Fund, in 1986.
2. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature, Senate
Bill 64, a proposed Liability Reform Act, was presented for
consideration. As presented, the early versions of the bill were
of serious concern to WCFU.
3. WCFU opposed the original versions of S.B. 64 because of
the language in them which, in the Fund's view at that time, might
have permitted comparison of an employer's "fault" in arriving at
verdicts in third-party lawsuits. That, in turn, might have
required the Fund to defend employers in civil litigation to
protect the subrogation lien rights specified in the Workers'
Compensation Act of Utah (S 35-1-62) when the employer was joined
involuntarily. The increased cost of defending employers, along
with the potential loss of third-party recoveries by the
comparison of employer "fault," and the great potential incursion
of the proposed legislation on the "exclusive remedy provision"
of the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah (S 35-1-60) would
have increased the cost of workers' compensation insurance in the
State of Utah.
4. WCFU withdrew its opposition to S.B. 64 when, after
negotiation among interested parties and legislators, the language
in proposed S 78-27-39 was changed, deleting the words "and each
other person whose fault contributed," to restrict comparison of
fault to persons seeking recovery and defendants, as
00187
"defendants" is defined in S 78-27-37: those not iMUne from
suit.
DATED this CirC^ day of November, 1988.
STATE OF UTAH )
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Dennis V. Lloyd
On the 2CT* day of rV — U- ~- 1988, personally
appeared before me Dennis V. Lloyd, the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Al vW/yi
My Commission Expirest NOTARY PUBLIC \J ,
lO'^-Qb Residing .t: J)PlJt/vjJ(.a
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APPENDIX 11
Letter dated April 28, 1993
From Tim Dalton Dunn and Kendall P. Hatch to their clients
DUNN & DUNN
TRIAL LAWYERS
Tim Dalton Dunn 0q
Marx Dalton Dunn o
KentjallP. Hatch o
I. Rand Hirschio
GlenT. Haleoq
Carlton R. Erjcson o *
Kevin D, Swensono
Clinton D. Jensen o
Salt Lake City Office
Midtown Plaza. Sl-tte 460
230 Solth 500 East
Salt Lake Ctty, Utah 84102
telephone (801) 521-6666
fax.vumber (801)521-9998
Kauai Office
4473 Pahe'e Street . Sltte L
LlHUE, KaUaJ. Hawaii 96766
telephone (808) 826-4488
fax number (801)521-9998
Of Counsel:
Richard B. Cuatto o q
9 Afaunod ia Uuh a Admuuai in Hawaii ♦ AAnkied inCati/omia
April 28,1993
TO ALL CLIENTS OF DUNN & DUNN:
We have received an advance copy ofa decision by the Utah Supreme Court that
wUl greatly impact the amounts paid by insurance carriers in the event of an adversejudgment in many personal injury cases. The case will probably be known as Sullivan v.
Scoular Grain, et al. In that case, several defendants were named, oneof whom was the
plaintiffs employer. The case was originally filed in the United States District Court for
Utah andsentforcertification tothe Utah Supreme Court
The two certified questions the U.S. District Court asked the Utah Supreme Court
to answer are:
1. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann §78-27-38, et.
seq., can a jury apportion the fault of theplaintiffsemployer that caused or contributed to
the accident although said employers are immune from suit under Utah Workers'
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60, et. seq.
2. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38, et.
seq., can a jury apportion the fault of an individual or entity that has been dismissed from
the litigation but against whom it is claimed that they have caused or contributed to the
accident.
The answers of the Utah Supreme Court are as follows:
1. We hold that the purpose and intent of the Utah Liability Reform
Act require that a jury account for the relative proportion of fault of a
plaintiffs employer that may have caused or contributed to an
accident, even though the employer is immune from suit.
Apportionment of fault does not of itself subject the employer to civil
liability. Rather, the apportionment process merely insures that no
defendant is held liable to any claimant for an amount of damages in
excess of the percentage of fault attributable to that defendant.
Clients of Dunn & Dunn
Apnl28, 1993
Page -2-
2. We also hold that an individual or entity dismissed from a case
pursuant to an adjudication on the merits of the liability issue may not
be included in the apportionment. When a defendant is dismissed due
to a determination of lack of fault as a matter of law, the defendant's
exclusion from apportionment does not subject the remaining
defendants to liability for damages in excess of their proportionate
fault.
Prior to the above decision, if the employer were 90% at fault and the remaining
defendants were 10% at fault, the remaining defendants would pay 100% ofthe damages
Now the remaining defendants will only pay 10%, from which the workers compensation
carrier must still be reimbursed 100% of his Lien. By hypothetically applying different
percentages to the several parties you will find some exceptionally interesting results($100,000 indamages - plaintiff is 10% at fault, employer is40% at fault, two tort feasor
defendants are 25% at fault each - recovery $50,000, from which the workers
compensation lien must be paid.) ($100,000 in damages - plaintiff is 20% at fault,
employer is 70% at fault, two ton feasor defendants are 5% at fault each - recovery
$10,000, less the workers compensation lien.)
We see this caseas presently very favorable for the defense. We foresee this case
as alandmark from which later decisions will change the insurance industry considerably.
We believe there will possibly be anumber of decisions or legislative enactments that will
orcouldpossibly do one or all of the following:
1. Eliminate the immunity from suit of an employer.
2. Eliminate workers compensation liens.
3. Reduce workers compensation liens by the employer's percentage of fault
4. Require attorneys representing workers compensation carriers to make an
appearance in every applicable case to protect the employer's interest
5. - Eliminate the one-third payment to the plaintiffsattorney for protecting the
lienrights or collecting the workers compensation lien.
6. Possibly changing the scale of payments on workers compensation cases.
7. Impacting the rates from which premiums are calculated in several lines of
insurance.
The plaintiffs bar will not ignore this case. It presently reduces recovery by
plaintiffs in several matters that are now pending. The case creates certain inequities which
future decisions must address. (An employer is found to be 80% at fault which reduces the
plaintiffs recovery to 20% of his damages, from which the pany that is 80% at fault must
be reimbursed.)
Clients of Dunn & Dunn
April 28, 1993
Page -3-
„„; e, JUm:ICC Ste^frt'n his dissenting opinion says that the majority opinion "is not only
unjust and inequitable, but might well be unconstitutional." y
We will be happy to provide acopy of the decision to you if you desire one. Just
give us a call.
For those clients that write workers compensation insurance, we would also lLke to
make you aware o" House Bill No. 249 that was passed by the 1993 Legislature.
House BUI No. 249 requires insurers to print or display in comparative prominence
on applications for benefits the following wording:
For your protection, Utah law requires the following to
appear on this form.
Any person who knowingly presents false or fraudulent underwriting
information, files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim for
disability compensation or medical benefits, or submits a false orfraudulent report or billing for health care fees or other professional
services is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fines and
confinement in state prison.
Also above the endorsement area of each check issued for workers compensation
there must now appear the following wording:
Workers compensation insurance fraud is acrime punishable byUtah
law.
House Bill No. 249 also defines workers compensation fraud and eliminates some
of the standard prima facie elements of fraud required under other circumstances.
Ifyou would like acopy ofHouse Bill No. 249, please g}ve us acall.
Yours very trul1
DUNN
&/J-A
TTM DALTON DUNN
NDALL P. HATCH
KPH/plg
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APPENDIX 12
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT
A CAREFUL BALANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Employer
1. Exclusive remedy 1.
S35-1-60 U.C.A.
Action can only be
brought in administrative
proceedings.
2. Speedy resolution.
No lengthy jury trial
with its uncertainties.
Less costly.
3. Limited, predictable
fixed damages.
a. No pain and
suffering damages.
2.
3.
4.
b. No projected future
special damages.
Damages decided and 5.
paid as they accrue.
Broad based risk
spreading on industry 6.
through mandatory
insurance or qualifying
through bonding with 7.
Industrial Commission to
be a self-insured
employer.
Right to be reimbursed
from third party
recoveries §35-1-62.
a. Is "trustee" of the
cause of action for
injured worker or
dependant heirs in
death case.
All employers treated
alike.
T1Q34-1
Injured Worker aWH/T
Dependant RoSrq
A sure, predictable,
though limited remedy —
because of mandatory
insurance coverage.
No fault system — no
reduction or elimination
of benefits by comparable
fault.
Comparatively speedy and
inexpensive
administrative process.
Preservation of right to
pursue third parties for
full damages — §35-1-62,
U.C.A.
Employer and employee on
same side in third party
cases.
All employees treated
alike.
Continuing jurisdiction
of the Industrial
Commission to modify
awards based on changes
in injured employee's
condition. §3 5-1-7 3
U.C.A.
